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ARTICLES
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND CHOICE-OF-LAW:
IF WE MARRY IN HAWAII, ARE WE STILL
MARRIED WHEN WE RETURN HOME?
BARBARA J. Cox*
This Article explores the choice-of-law question of whether a same-sex couple,
married in Hawaii after successful completion of the Baehr v. Lewin case, will have
their marriage recognized by the state of their domicile upon their return from Hawaii.
This Article first applauds the Baehr court's decision that prohibiting same-sex marriage
is unconstitutional sex discrimination but then critiques its decision that the fundamental
right to marry does not extend to same-sex couples.
The second Part considers the choice-of-law questions that will arise in cases
litigating the validity of a couple's same-sex marriage upon their return to their
domicile. It considers statutory directives, such as marriage validation and evasion
statutes, and surveys the major choice-of-law theories in use today. Given the judicial
discretion whether to recognize these marriages, the third Part argues that judges should
recognize same-sex marriages using the better rule of law methodology. Recognizing
these marriages is "better" because it would end age-old discrimination based on
prejudice and misunderstanding, and would eliminate overzealous state interference with
and condemnation of a most personal and intimate relationship. This Article analogizes
from choice-of-law cases which arose during the reign of anti-miscegenation statutes to
argue that the post-Baehr cases will expose the inherent discrimination that underlies the
prohibition of same-sex marriage and argues for using choice-of-law principles to end
that discrimination.
The Stonewall riots on June 27, 1969' changed the face of the
lesbian and gay civil rights movement in a public way that was
unprecedented. In fact, those riots, in which primarily young, nonwhite,
drag queens stood up to challenge the continuous police harassment that
dogged their lives, are universally recognized as the ignition point for the
modern lesbian and gay civil rights movement.2 Without ignoring the
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; B.A. 1978, Michigan
State University; J.D. 1982, University of Wisconsin. The author wishes to thank her
research assistants, Michael Egan, Kim Jones, Cynthia Masbaum, and Gary Mintz, for
their valuable assistance; librarian Linda Weathers for her support in obtaining documents;
secretary Mary Ellen Norvell for her assistance in preparing this Article; and Professors
Janet Bowermaster, Susan Channick, John Noyes and Frank Valdes for commenting on
earlier drafts. She would also like to thank Peg Habetler for providing inspiration and
sustaining her spirit.
1. JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF
A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-1970, at 231 (1983).
2. Id. at 231-33.
1034 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
previous decades of courageous struggle led by countless pioneers,3 those
riots became a rallying point around which lesbians and gay men,
scattered across the country throughout numerous communities, moved
away from the shadowy existence most had lived and toward a willingness
to speak openly of our4 existence and our refusal to accept society's
denial, harassment, and deprivation.'
That movement led to the April 1993 March on Washington where
nearly a million lesbians and gay men stood openly and proudly before
the President, Congress, the entire country, and the world and demanded
even more changes in the status quo.' We demonstrated for increased
AIDS funding, for parental rights, for freedom to express our sexuality
without fear of repressive laws, to serve openly in the military, for
recognition as equal members of society, and for repeal of laws that harm
us and passage of civil rights laws to protect us.7
One of the major events that took place during the weekend of the
March was "The Wedding." Hundreds of couples joined together and
exchanged vows in the presence of assembled friends and families
These are vows which every state in the country refuses to recognize.'
3. See generally id. (discussing the homophile movement from 1940 through
1970 and the way in which the members of that movement paved the way for the gay
rights liberation movement which followed the Stonewall riots).
4. Following up on significant discussion in the feminist community, I subscribe
to the anti-essentialist tenet which states that there are no outside observers when
analyzing any issue. "It is important to reflect upon your own location in relation to the
issue and the people under discussion, because your perspective necessarily affects the
way you perceive and the way you are perceived by others." Nitya Duclos, Some
Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, 1 LAw & SEXUALITY 31, 40 (1991). The
perspectives I bring to this Article include my years teaching feminist theory and sexual
orientation theory as a law professor, my years spent as a community activist working on
recognition of domestic partners and alternative families, and my years spent as an "out"
lesbian and partner in a long-term committed relationship. For a list of articles discussing
anti-essentialism, see id. at 35 n.15.
5. D'EMILIo, supra note 1, at 246-47.
6. After the March, a significant discrepancy surfaced between March organizers
and U.S. Park Police estimates regarding the number of demonstrators. Organizers
claimed that one million people attended the march, while park police estimated 300,000
participated. Charles W. Hall, The Clash over Crowd Estimates, WASH. POST, Apr. 26,
1993, at Al.
7. Bettina Boxall & James Gerstenzang, Gays, Lesbians Celebrate on Eve of
Rights March, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at Al.
8. Id.
9. Duclos, supra note 4, at 31-32. Although same sex marriages are not
permitted in Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands, these countries have adopted
"registered partnerships," which are closely modeled after the concept of marriage. Some
differences remain. For example, in Denmark, same sex couples cannot adopt one
another's children or unrelated children, cannot share custody of children, cannot form
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Their recognition would forever change the landscape of lesbian and gay
rights in the United States.
Stonewall symbolized a break from accepting the status quo, and
very little since those riots has challenged the lesbian and gay community
as much as the debate over marriage. This debate has spanned the past
several years and includes the question whether seeking the right to marry
should be the focus of our community's efforts, political influence, and
financial resources." As is often true in such political debates, both
a partnership unless one of the parties is a citizen of the country, and cannot have the
partnership recognized in other countries. Shaughn Morgan, Legal Recognition of Gay
and Lesbian Relationships, 3 AUSTRALASIAN GAY & LESBIAN L.J. 57, 64-65 (1993).
10. Perhaps the best known presentation of the "debate" occurred in Gay
Marriage: A Must or a Bust?, where Paula Ettelbrick argued in Since When Was Marriage
a Path to Liberation? against pursuing a right to same-sex marriage and Tom Stoddard
argued in Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry in favor of pursuing same-sex
marriage, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAW 398 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993).
Other articles discussing whether lesbians and gay men should pursue the right of same-
sex marriage include: a symposium issue of the Law & Sexuality Review where Professors
Harlon L. Dalton, Nan D. Hunter, Nitya Duclos, and Mary C. Dunlap discuss this
question, see Symposium, The Family in the 1990s: An Exploration of Lesbian and Gay
Rights, 1 LAW & SEXUALrrY 1 (1989); Michael L. Closen & Carol R. Heise, HIV-AIDS
and the Non-Traditional Family: The Argumentfor State and Federal Judicial Recognition
of Danish Same-Sex Marriages, 16 NOVA L. REV. 809 (1992); Ruth Colker, Marriage,
3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 321 (1991); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980); Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(H)ers:
Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L.Q. 511 (1990).
Other articles on same-sex marriages include: G. Sidney Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage:
The Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 541 (1985); Catherine M. Cullem,
Fundamental Interests and the Question of Same-Sex Marriage, 15 TULSA L.J. 141
(1979); Alissa Friedman, The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
134 (1987); John D. Ingram, A Constitutional Critique of Restrictions on the Right to
Marry-Why Can't Fred Marry George-Or Mary and Alice at the Same Time, 10 J.
CONTEMP. L. 33 (1984); Claudia A. Lewis, From This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral
Discourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE L.J. 1783 (1988); Dwight J. Penas, Bless
the Tie That Binds: A Puritan-Covenant Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 8 LAW & INEQ. J.
533 (1990); Hannah Schwarzchild, Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Privacy: Moral
Threat and Legal Anomaly, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 94 (1988); Mark Strasser,
Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 981 (1991); Otis R. Danslet, Note, Same-Sex Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HuM. RTS. 555 (1993); Deborah Gray, Note, Marriage: Homosexual Couples Need Not
Apply, 23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 515 (1988); Julienne C. Scocca, Comment, Society's Ban
on Same-Sex Marriages: A Reevaluation of the So-Called "Fundamental Right" of
Marriage, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 719 (1992); Arthur J. Silverstein, Comment,
Constitutional Aspects of the Homosexual's Right to a Marriage License, 12 J. FAM. L.
607 (1972); Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, Same-Sex Marriage: A Review, 17 WM.
MrrCHELLL. REV. 539 (1991); Note, Homosexuals 'Right to Marry:A Constitutional Test
and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1979); Note, The Legality of
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sides to the debate make important arguments about the impact that the
right to marry will have on each member of our community, on the
community as a whole, and on our place in society."1
Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973).
11. In Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, Paula Ettelbrick argues
against same sex marriage because she believes it will not liberate lesbians and gay men,
but rather will make us more invisible, force assimilation, and undermine the lesbian and
gay civil rights movement. Ettelbrick, supra note 10, at 402. She also argues that same
sex marriage will not encourage society to respect relationship choice and family diversity,
goals central to the gay and lesbian civil rights movement. Id. Ruth Colker, in Marriage,
echoes Ettelbrick's concerns, arguing that rather than expanding the concept of marriage
to more types of couples, we should change the institution of marriage to eliminate its
marriage-dependent benefits, so that people will choose it for symbolic, rather than legal
or utilitarian, reasons. Colker, supra note 10, at 324. Colker also recognizes the class-
based assumptions inherent in the marriage debate, realizing that for most poor people,
marriage offers few economic advantages. Id. at 325. Nitya Duclos examines four
reasons advanced for same-sex marriage (political reform, public legitimation,
socioeconomic benefits, and safeguarding children of lesbian or gay parents) in her article
Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4. She concludes the
lesbian and gay communities will not uniformly feel the effect of allowing same sex
marriages, and questions whether marriage will exacerbate differences of power and
privilege in those communities. Id. at 58-59.
In Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, Thomas Stoddard notes the
oppressive nature of marriage in its traditional form, but believes that lesbians and gay
men should be able to choose to marry and that the civil rights movement should seek full
recognition of same-sex marriages. Stoddard, supra note 10, at 398. Stoddard's three
stated reasons for pursuing this right are the practical advantages associated with
marriage-related benefits, the political strategy of using marriage to end discrimination
against lesbians and gay men, and a philosophical explanation that lesbians and gay men
should have the right to choose to marry. Providing that right, he believes, will be the
principal means toward eliminating marriage's sexist trappings. Id. at 399-401. Nan
Hunter argues that legalizing lesbian and gay marriage will destabilize marriage's
gendered definition by disrupting the link between gender and marriage. Nan Hunter,
Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 12 (1989). She
analyzes both marriage and domestic partnership against the feminist inquiry of how law
reinforces power imbalances within the family, and views same-sex marriage as a means
to subvert gender-based power differentials. Id. Mary Dunlap finds that same-sex
marriage is constructive in combatting the gay-bashing which lesbians and gay men are
encountering as a result of the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Mary Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes and
Troubles in the Nineties, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 63, 81 (1989). She examines the values
underlying the push for same-sex marriage (such as equality, autonomy, fairness, privacy,
and diversity) and encourages expansion of the marriage debate outside legal circles. Id.
at 85.
For interviews with lesbian and gay couples, some of whom have chosen to have
public ceremonies celebrating their commitment and some of whom have chosen to keep
their commitment private, see generally LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE
COMMITMENTS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992).
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Without resolving that debate here, 2 it seems clear that obtaining
12. The debate continues to rage, as seen from articles contained in the Virginia
Law Review's recent symposium issue. Compare William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of
Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REv. 1419 (1993) (arguing that historical acceptance of
same-sex marriage indicates its appropriate place in modem society) with Nancy D.
Polikoff, We W711 Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will
Not 'Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage, " 79 VA. L. REV. 1535
(1993) (arguing in contrast that same-sex marriage will neither liberate lesbians or gay
men nor heterosexual marriage). For a fascinating historical account of same-sex
marriage, see JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE (1994).
My response to the debate (obviously favoring marriage as an option, as revealed
by the tone of this Article) is best expressed in the following short essay, which explains
the vital political change that can result from the simple act of same-sex marriage.
Yes, I know that weddings can be "heterosexual rituals" of the most repressive and
repugnant kind. Yes, I know that weddings historically have symbolized the loss of the
woman's self into that of her husband's, a denial of her existence completely. Yes, I
know that weddings around the world continue to have that impact on many women and
often lead to lives of virtual slavery. Yes, I know. Then how could a feminist, out,
radical lesbian like myself get married in April 1992? Have I simply joined the flock of
lesbians and gay men rushing out to participate in a meaningless ceremony that symbolizes
heterosexual superiority?
I think not.
When my partner and I decided to have a commitment ceremony, we did so to
express the love and caring that we feel for one another, to celebrate that love with our
friends and family, and to express that love openly and with pride. It angers me when
others, who did not participate or do not know either of us, condemn us as part of a
mindless flock accepting a dehumanizing ceremony. But it distresses me more that they
believe that their essentialist vision of weddings explains all-because they have been to
weddings, both straight and queer, they can speak as experts on the inherent nature of
marriage.
Perhaps these experts should consider the radical aspect of lesbian marriage or the
transformation that it makes on the people around us. As feminists, we used to say that
"the personal is political." Have we lost that vision of how we can understand and
change the world?
. My commitment ceremony was not the mere "aping" of the bride that I supposedly
spent my childhood dreaming of becoming. In fact, I was a very satisfied tomboy who
never once considered marriage. My ceremony was an expression of the incredible love
and respect that I have found with my partner. My ceremony came from a need to speak
openly of that love and respect to those who participate in my world.
Those months of preparing for and having that ceremony produced some of the most
politically "out" experiences I have ever had. My sister and I discussed for weeks
whether she would bring her children to the ceremony. Although I had always openly
brought the women with whom I was involved home with me, I had never actually sat
down with my niece and nephews to discuss those relationships. My sister was concerned
that her eldest son, particularly, might scorn me, especially at a time when he and his
friends tended toward "faggot" jokes. After I expressed how important it was for me to
have them attend, she tried to talk with her son about going to this euphemistically-entitled
"ceremony." He kept asking why my partner and I were having a "ceremony" and she
kept hedging. Finally he just said, "Mom, Barb's gay, right?" She said yes, they all
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the right to marry will drastically impact the lesbian and gay civil rights
movement. Our internal discussion has primarily focused on whether we
should pursue this right, whether it is good for our community, and
whether it is good for ourselves individually. But this internal discussion
has recently expanded.
With the case of Baehr v. Lewin, 3 the Hawaii Supreme Court has
moved the issue beyond our community. Without waiting for the long
struggle involved with petitioning state legislatures to expand the marriage
came, and things were fine. Her youngest son sat next to me at dinner after the
ceremony, and tried to understand how the marriage worked. "You're married, right?"
"Yes." "Who's the husband?" "There is no husband." "Are you going to have children?"
"No." "So there's no husband and no children but you're married, right?" "Yes." "OK,"
and he happily turned back to his dinner.
My partner invited her large Catholic family to the ceremony. We all know how
the Pope feels about us. Despite that, her mother and most of her siblings, some from
several states away, were able to attend. Her twin brother later told us that our ceremony
led him to question and resolve the discomfort that had plagued his relationship with his
sister for many years.
Because I was leaving town early for the ceremony, I explained to my two law
classes (one of 95 and one of 20 students) that I was getting "married" to my partner,
who is a woman. (I actually used the word "married" because saying I was getting
"committed" just didn't quite have the right ring to it.) The students in one of my classes
joined together to buy my partner and me a silver engraved frame that says "Barb and
Peg, Our Wedding." My colleagues were all invited to the ceremony and most of them
attended. One of them spoke to me about the discussion he and his wife had within their
family explaining to the children that they were going to a lesbian wedding.
How can anyone view these small victories in coming out and acceptance as part of
flocking to imitate, or worse join, a potentially oppressive heterosexual institution? Is it
not profoundly transformative to speak so openly about lesbian love and commitment?
The impact was so wide-ranging, not just on my partner and myself, but on our families,
our friends, and even the clerks in the jewelry stores when we explained we were looking
for wedding rings for both of us. The ceremony impacted the 200 people who received
my mother's annual xeroxed Christmas letter with a paragraph describing the ceremony.
It impacted the clerk in the store who engraved the frame for my students, and the young
children who learned that same-sex marriage exists.
Yes, we must be aware of the oppressive history that weddings symbolize. We must
work to ensure that we do not simply accept whole-cloth an institution that symbolizes the
loss and harm felt by women. But I find it difficult to understand how two lesbians,
standing together openly and proudly, can be seen as accepting that institution. What is
more anti-patriarchal and critical of an institution that carries the patriarchal power
imbalance into most households than clearly stating that women can commit to one
another with no man in sight?-to commit to one another with no claim of dominion or
control, but instead with equality and respect? I understand the fears of those who
condemn us for our weddings, but I believe they fail to look beyond the symbol and
cannot see the radical claim we are making.
13. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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statutes, a few courageous same-sex couples"' decided that they wanted
to marry and wanted the option of having that marriage recognized."
These couples brought their action, lost in the trial court, and appealed to
the highest court of Hawaii, asking that a history of discrimination and
denial not prevent them from obtaining state recognition of the personal
commitment each member of the couple was prepared to make to the
other. Perhaps to the plaintiffs' surprise, the Hawaii Supreme Court took
their request seriously and could find little reason to prevent their
marriages. The Baehr court held that the Hawaii marriage statute violated
Hawaii's constitutional prohibition against sex discrimination and that the
statute was presumably unconstitutional unless, upon remand, the State
could establish that the statute was justified by a compelling state interest
and was narrowly drawn so as to avoid unnecessary abridgement of the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 6 That question will be addressed by the
trial court upon remand. 7
Although those of us in the community who have longed to see this
day arrive are still holding our collective breath, it seems likely that in the
near future, Hawaii, or perhaps another state, will grant us the same right
to marry as all other adult citizens, absent some statutory bar.'" Once
14. When this Article refers to same-sex couples, it presumes that these couples
will consist of lesbians or gay men. The Hawaii Supreme Court stated that whether the
plaintiffs were homosexuals was irrelevant for its analysis, id. at 58 n. 17, even though it
could be expected that most people who would form a same-sex couple and attempt to
marry would be lesbians or gay men. Doctrinally, the question of whether same-sex
marriage would be found to be protected against sexual orientation discrimination, rather
than sex discrimination, may result in a different answer. See generally Francisco Valdes,
Sexual Minorities in the Military: Charting the Constitutional Frontiers of Status and
Conduct, 27 CREioHTON L. REv. 381 (1994).
15. The plaintiffs were two lesbian couples and one gay couple: Ninia Baehr,
Genom Dancel, Tammy Rodrigues, Antoinette Pregil, Pat Lagon, and Joseph Melilio.
852 P.2d at 48.
16. Id. at 68.
17. id. at 74 (granting motion for clarification). Legal experts agree that meeting
the "compelling state interest" standard rarely occurs, unless public safety is at stake. In
fact, the Hawaii Attorney General, Robert A. Marks, had been "clutching at straws" in
trying to express ways in which prohibiting same-sex marriage furthered some compelling
state interest. What impact the newly passed statute, Act 217, will have on the remand
is unknown. See infra note 91. Some believe that the language in the Act "clarifying"
that the marriage statutes are only intended to apply to "one man and one woman" may
persuade the court that the same-sex marriage prohibition is "benign" discrimination.
Jane Gross, After a Ruling, Hawaii Weighs Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994,
at Al, B8. Given the extensive benefits that opposite-sex couples receive but that same-
sex couples are denied, it is difficult to take seriously any claim that denial of the
opportunity to marry could be considered benign discrimination. See infra notes 59-65
and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
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that happens, another stage in the struggle toward same-sex marriage will
begin.
We will take our marriage certificate home with us from Hawaii (or
another state), the glow of family and friends celebrating our joy and
commitment with us (hopefully)19 will start to fade, and we will frame
our pictures and polish our rings. We will then ask our employers to
enroll us as a married couple for health insurance, ask our lawyer to write
our wills as a married couple, apply for marital discounts at our health
clubs, move into a single-family neighborhood, file joint tax returns as a
married couple, and perhaps change our names. Each time we assert our
new marital status, people will look and question, whisper and ask (just
as they currently do whenever we step out of the closet). We will have
to fight new legal battles over whether our home state and the various
institutional entities within it will recognize our newly acquired status and
whether they will protect it to the same extent that they protect opposite-
sex married couples' status.
This major question will be resolved by considering the choice-of-law
questions surrounding whether a lesbian or gay couple married in a state
which allows them to marry will receive recognition of the marriage in
their home state, which has not granted the right to marry. Must one's
home state recognize this new marital status, or is it only valid if one
remains in the state where the marriage was celebrated? Without such
home-state recognition, we will have won a meager right indeed. For
although most of us would be happy to live forever in Hawaii, whatever
has kept us in our home states will probably still pull us to return, and we
will bring with us, besides our snapshots and fading leis, a demand that
our new marital status accompany us.
This Article is composed of three main Parts. The first discusses the
Baehr decision, questioning the analytical framework which the Hawaii
court used. Specifically, it argues that the court was correct in its
decision to use the Loving v. Virginia analysis in holding that the
denial of the right to marry was sex discrimination in violation of
Hawaii's equal protection clause,2" just as the same denial was race
discrimination in Loving. Within its equal protection analysis, the court
rejected custom and history as acceptable bases for denying same-sex
marriage, but was unable to reject those same rationales when considering
whether same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry. The court
incorrectly framed the issue, leading it to make the same analytical error
19. For a discussion of problems that lesbians and gay men have faced upon
deciding to have a marriage ceremony, see LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE
COMMITMENTS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES, supra note 11, at 3-4.
20. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
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that the U.S. Supreme Court made in Bowers v. Hardwick.2 Just as the
Bowers court erred by asking whether there exists a fundamental right to
homosexual sodomy, instead of asking whether there exists a fundamental
right to privacy in one's choice of sexual partners, so too did the Baehr
court err in asking whether there exists a fundamental right to same-sex
marriage, instead of asking whether there exists a fundamental right to
marry which should include same-sex couples.
The second Part begins by presenting the underlying choice-of-law
principle which generally controls recognition of out-of-state marriage
cases: if a marriage is valid where celebrated, then it is entitled to
recognition in the celebrants' home state.' Whether this recognition
will occur, however, depends on policy decisions made by state
legislatures and state courts. Although many states have statutes affirming
this rule, others have statutes prohibiting "evasion" of state marriage
restrictions by domiciliaries leaving the state, marrying in another state,
and returning to the pre-marital domicile. States without these statutory
mandates turn to choice-of-law theories for guidance in making the policy
decision whether to affirm or reject the couple's marriage. A review of
these statutes and theories leads the reader to understand that little more
than guidance exists. Courts retain significant discretion in deciding
whether to recognize their domiciliaries' out-of-state marriages.
The third Part, acknowledging this discretion, argues for the use of
choice-of-law theories encouraging recognition of "the better rule of law"
to resolve these conflicts. In these cases, the better rule of law would be
to honor the same-sex marriage. Such a choice is "better" because it
eliminates age-old discrimination based on prejudice and
misunderstanding, and because it eliminates overzealous state interference
with and condemnation of a most personal and intimate relationship. This
Part considers the analogous legal revolution which led to rejecting anti-
miscegenation statutes because they were based on irrational prejudice.
22. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
23. Wilis L.M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflict of Laws, 26 INT'L &
CoM. L.Q. 952, 955 (1977). Some commentators argue that other states must recognize
Hawaiian marriages under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See
Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?.- Full Faith
and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of Law Regarding the Status
and Incidents of Homosexual Marriage Following Hawaii's Baehr v. Levin, 32 J. Fam.
L. (forthcoming 1994); Evan Wolfson & Gregory V.S. McCurdy, "Let No One Set
Asunder": Full Faith and Credit for Validly Contracted Marriages of Same-Sex and
Different-Sex Couples (forthcoming 1994). See generally Douglas Laycock, Equal
Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law,
92 COLUM. L. REv. 249 (1992); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on
State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and
Credit and Due Process Clauses, 14 CREIOHTON L. REv. 499 (1981).
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That revolution was fueled by the numerous choice-of-law cases
determining whether states should recognize the interracial marriages
entered into by couples fleeing prejudicial laws. The choice-of-law cases
that will arise once any state recognizes same-sex marriage will again
provide an opportunity for courts to reject similar antiquated restrictions.
Some choice-of-law theories permit recognition of the progressive
dynamics driving the Baehr court's rejection of discrimination against
same-sex couples. The better rule of law, recognized by many of these
theories as an important factor for courts to consider when making
difficult policy decisions,' should lead jurists to a gradual acceptance of
same-sex marriage, even if not statutorily permitted in many states for
several years to come.
This Article begins by reviewing the case which may have a greater
impact on lesbian and gay rights than anything that has occurred in the
twenty-five years since the Stonewall riots, a case that is potentially even
more important than Bowers. But this Article does not end its focus
there. Instead, it assumes that Hawaii, or some other state, will grant the
right of same-sex marriage in the near future, and grapples with the
interesting choice-of-law question that will follow immediately after
recognition of that right.
I. BAEnR v. LEWIN
The Hawaii Supreme Court made history on May 5, 1993 when it
remanded the case of Baehr v. Lewin2- to the trial court to determine
whether the State of Hawaii had committed sex discrimination by refusing
to grant marriage licenses to the plaintiffs. The trial court is now
considering this question and will soon issue its decision as to whether the
state of Hawaii met its burden on remand.
The Hawaii Supreme Court's analysis in finding that a prohibition
against same-sex marriage violated the state constitution's equal protection
clause, while simultaneously determining that same-sex couples do not
have a fundamental right to marry, is questionable. In determining that
abridging the couples' right to marry was sex discrimination, the court
did not fall into the trap of embracing the tautological argument presented
by the State of Virginia in Loving v. Virginia that Virginia was not
discriminating on the basis of race because divine providence had not
intended that the marriage state extend to interracial unions.2 Similarly,
24. Courts in states that do not currently use the "better rule of law" in their
choice-of-law analysis can use the analysis suggested infra part III.A to conclude that the
"better" public policy result would be to validate the same-sex marriage.
25. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
26. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
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the Baehr court rejected the argument that the state was not discriminating
on the basis of sex because same-sex couples were definitionally incapable
of forming a marriage, which by definition required an opposite-sex
couple.' But that same reasoning should have led it to conclude that the
Hawaii marriage statutes also denied the plaintiffs their fundamental right
to marry.
In Baehr, the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Baehr/Dancel,
Rodrigues/Pregil, and Lagon/Melilio applied for marriage licenses with
the Department of Health (DOH) under Hawaii Revised Statute section
572-6.2s The DOH refused to grant their applications and sent letters to
each couple stating its belief that "the law of Hawaii does not treat a
union between members of the same sex as a valid marriage."' The
plaintiffs claimed that they had met all marriage requirements except for
the stated prohibition against same-sex applicants, that they were being
denied marriage licenses because of DOH's statutory construction, and
that DOH was acting in its official capacity and under color of state law
in denying their applications. 0  The plaintiffs claimed that the
determination made by DOH violated their rights to privacy under article
I, section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution, and their rights to equal protection
of the laws and due process under article I, section 5 of the Hawaii
Constitution.3"
The Hawaii Supreme Court reviewed the trial court's grant of the
defendant Lewin's 32 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted,33 which was part of a motion for judgment
on the pleadings.' The defendant's motion was unsupported by
27. 852 P.2d at 63.
28. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-6 (Supp. 1992) enunciates the requirements to obtain
a marriage license in Hawaii. The person must appear personally before an agent and file
a written application. The application must include a signed statement of each person's
full name, date of birth, residence, relationship, parents' full names, and a statement that
all prior marriages, if any, have been dissolved. The statute then directs the agent to
issue the license which will be in force for thirty days. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 49 n.2.
29. Id. at 49-50 n.3.
30. Id. at 50.
31. Id. The plaintiffs did not raise the issue of whether DOH's refusal denied
them corresponding rights of privacy, equal protection, and due process under the United
States Constitution. It can be assumed that they did not invoke the United States
Constitution due to the increasingly limited protection that Court has given to
homosexuals. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
32. John C. Lewin participated in the proceedings in his official capacity as
Director of the Department of Health, State of Hawaii. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48.
33. HAW. DIST. CT. R.C.P. § 12(b)(6).
34. HAW. DIST. CT. R.C.P. § 12(h)(2) permits the defense of failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted to be made in a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. See also id. § 12(c). In addition to his motion for judgment on the pleadings,
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affidavits, as the parties had not yet conducted discovery. 35 Lewin's
motion stated that Hawaii's marriage law considered marriage valid only
as between a man and a woman, that the only marriage of right was a
heterosexual marriage which left the plaintiffs with no cognizable right to
enter into homosexual marriages,' and that the state's marriage laws did
not burden or penalize the plaintiffs' private relationships in any way.37
The plaintiffs opposed Lewin's motion and argued that they had a
fundamental constitutional right to sexual orientation.3 8 They repeated
their claim that DOH's refusal to grant them licenses violated their rights
to privacy, equal protection and due process.39 On October 1, 1991, the
trial court granted Lewin's motion for judgment on the pleadings and
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.'
On appeal, a plurality of the supreme court noted that the trial court
erred in making numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law.41
Lewin asserted defenses of sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and abstention in
favor of legislative action. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 50. The trial court ruled only on the
motion for judgment on the pleadings and did not consider Lewin's other defenses. Id.
at 50 n.6. The supreme court also did not consider those defenses. id.
35. Id. at 51.
36. The court noted that the plaintiffs' complaint did not allege that any of the
plaintiffs were homosexuals and that Lewin's motion sought to place the issue of
homosexuality before the court. Id. at 52 n. 12. The court stated that it was irrelevant,
for its constitutional analysis, whether the plaintiffs were homosexuals. Id. at 53 n.14.
Although the court refers to lesbians and gay men as homosexuals, this Article uses
the terms lesbians and gay men instead.
37. Id. at 51-52. Lewin's memorandum also stated that "(4) the state is under no
obligation 'to take affirmative steps to provide homosexual unions with its official
approval'; (5) the state's marriage laws 'protect and foster and may help to perpetuate the
basic family unit, regarded as vital to society, that provides status and a nurturing
environment to children born to married persons' and, in addition, 'constitute a statement
of the moral values of the community in a manner that is not burdensome to [the]
plaintiffs'; (6) assuming the plaintiffs are homosexuals [a fact not pleaded in the plaintiffs'
complaint] they 'are neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect class and do not require
heightened judicial solicitude'; and (7) even if heightened judicial solicitude is warranted,
the state's marriage laws 'are so removed from penalizing, burdening, harming, or
otherwise interfering with [the] plaintiffs and their relationships and perform such a
critical function in society that they must be sustained.'" Id. at 52.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. ld.
41. Id. at 54. Among the trial court's findings of fact were that HAW. REV.
STAT. § 572-1 does not infringe on a person's individuality or lifestyle decisions, does not
restrict or burden the exercise of the right to engage in a homosexual lifestyle, that the
plaintiffs failed to show that they had been ostracized or oppressed in Hawaii, that
homosexuals in Hawaii are not in a position of political powerlessness, that there was no
evidence that the "homosexual agenda" had failed to gain legislative support in Hawaii,
that plaintiffs had not established that homosexuals were a suspect class for equal
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The plurality considered its task to be determining whether Lewin was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and whether it appeared beyond
doubt that the plaintiffs could not prove any set of facts in support of their
claim which would entitle them to relief.42 The plurality held that the
circuit court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint and vacated that
decision for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.'
Just what proceedings would be consistent with the plurality's
opinion remains unclear. The plurality, consisting of Justices Levinson
and Moon, remanded to the trial court indicating that Lewin would be
required at trial to "overcome the presumption that HRS § 572-1 is
unconstitutional by demonstrating that it furthers compelling state interests
and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of
constitutional rights."" Justice Burns, who filed a concurring opinion,
held that the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint because the case
contained genuine issues of material fact.' Justice Burns indicated that
his interpretation of the word "sex" in the Hawaii Constitution included
"all aspects of each person's 'sex' that are 'biologically fated.'" ' He
then concluded that if "heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and
asexuality are 'biologically fated[,]' then the word 'sex' also includes
those differences." 47  If indeed the word "sex" in the Hawaii
Constitution encompasses those differences, Burns would "probably"
conclude that the Hawaii Constitution forbids discrimination against "the
sexual orientation difference."" If these differences are not
protection purposes, that the question of whether homosexuality is immutable has
engendered significant dispute in the scientific community, and that § 572-1 "obviously"
was designed to promote the community's general welfare by sanctioning "traditional
man-woman family units and procreation." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 53-54. The trial court
erred by making findings of fact when improperly reviewing a claim that was evidentiary
in nature, even though the trial court did not have any evidentiary record before it. Id.
at 53.
The trial court's conclusions of law (although not denominated as such) were: the
right to enter into a homosexual marriage is not a fundamental right under the Hawaii
Constitution; allowing heterosexual, but not homosexual, marriage does not violate due
process under that constitution; homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class for purposes
of equal protection analysis; and § 572-1 meets the rational relationship test under equal
protection analysis because it is clearly "a rational, legislative effort to advance the
general welfare of the community by permitting only heterosexual couples to legally
marry." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 54.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 68.
44. id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 69.
47. Id. at 69-70.
48. Id. at 70.
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"biologically fated[,]" then "sex" does not include those differences and,
according to Burns, Hawaii could prefer heterosexuality over
homosexuality without violating its constitution. 9 Thus, Justice Burns
would have remanded for a trial to determine the relevant questions of
fact as to whether heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and
asexuality are "biologically fated."'
On a motion for reconsideration or clarification by Lewin, the
plurality again ordered Lewin to overcome the presumption that Hawaii
Revised Statute section 572-1 is unconstitutional. 1  Justice Burns
indicated, however, that given the court's three opinions, 2 the only
thing agreed upon by a majority of the court was that the case involved
genuine issues of material fact which required a trial. 53  The case is
currently pending before the trial court.
While concluding that the trial court order violated Hawaii's equal
protection clause and unresolved factual questions precluded entry of
judgment,' the court rejected the plaintiffs' claims that their rights to
privacy and due process were harmed by the state permitting only
heterosexual marriage.5 5  By carefully examining the court's equal
protection analysis, it becomes clear that this same analysis should have
led the court to also recognize same-sex couples' fundamental right to
marry.
A. Prohibiting Same-Sex Marriage Violates Hawaii's
Equal Protection Clause
The court began its equal protection analysis by stating that marriage
is a state-conferred legal status.-6 The state's power to confer that status
is exclusive, as seen by the fact that Hawaii has eliminated common law
marriages, thus forcing all people interested in getting married to meet the
49. Id.
50. id.
51. Id. at 74.
52. Those opinions consist of the plurality of Levinson-Moon, the concurrenceof
Bums, and the dissent of Heen-Havashi. Actually, Justice Havashi, who was on the court
through a temporary assignment, was no longer a member of the court when Heen's
dissent was issued on May 5, 1993, but the opinion indicates that he would have joined
in Justice Heen's dissent had he remained. Id. at 48 n.*.
53. Id. at 75. In fact, Bums stated that "there is no majority agreement as to
what these issues are or which side has the burden to prove them." id. For the
remainder of this Article, a reference to "the court" will mean the plurality opinion.
54. Id. at 54.
55. Id. at 57.
56. Id. at 58.
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statutory requirements. 7 The state's "monopoly" on creating marriages
has been codified for more than 100 years."
The court acknowledged that DOH's refusal to allow the plaintiffs to
marry deprived them of numerous significant rights and benefits that are
based on marital status." Those rights include:
(1) a variety of state income tax advantages, including
deductions, credits, rates, exemptions and estimates; (2) public
assistance from and exemptions relating to the Department of
Human Services; (3) control, division, acquisition, and
disposition of community property; (4) rights relating to dower,
curtesy, and inheritance; (5) rights to notice, protections,
benefits, and inheritance under the Uniform Probate Code; (6)
award of child custody and support payments in divorce
proceedings; (7) the right to spousal support; (8) the right to
enter into premarital agreements; (9) the right to change of
name; (10) the right to file a nonsupport action; (11) post-
divorce rights relating to support and property division; (12) the
benefit of the spousal privilege and confidential marital
communications; (13) the benefit of the exemption of real
property from attachment or execution; and (14) the right to
bring a wrongful death action.'
The court also noted that it was undisputed, for the purposes of the suit,
that the applicant couples would be entitled to receive all these benefits
and rights were it not for the state's prohibition against same-sex
marriage."
The court did not discuss other rights and benefits that same-sex
couples would also obtain were they entitled to bona fide marital status.
These benefits for lesbian and gay couples would include the public
legitimation and community recognition that one's primary relationship
deserves.' Same-sex marriage might also legitimate the sexual
relationship between adults in a family, lessening the risk that the children
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 59.
60. Id. at 59 (citations to statutes omitted).
61. Id.
62. Duclos, supra note 4, at 50-51. Duclos, however, goes on to argue that
neither public legitimation nor community approval will necessarily result in less
discrimination against lesbians and gay men. /d. at 51. She notes that double standards
can remain, and that a "public" right to marry may not carry over into religious or
familial recognition of the marriage. Id.
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in the family would be taken out of their homes by a finding of parental
unfitness.' It is also likely that, if lesbians and gay men were allowed
to marry, they would be able to seek injunctive relief from prosecutions
for sodomy and thereby dismantle the legacy of Bowers: sodomy statutes
prohibiting oral/genital or anal/genital sexual conduct. 4  Finally,
permitting lesbian and gay couples to marry might help countless
individuals to realize that intimate and committed relationships are not
limited to opposite-sex couplings.'
The Baehr court did recognize that the ability of the state to restrict
marriage is subject to constitutional limitations.' While the state may
deny individuals the right to marry, it may only do so for compelling
reasons, such as consanguinity (to avoid incest), immature age (to prevent
child marriage), venereal disease (to protect health), or bigamy.'
Limitations that are not based on such compelling reasons," such as the
prohibition against same-sex marriage, run afoul of the equal protection
clause.
Hawaii's equal protection clause is more detailed than the United
States' version. It declares that "[n]o person shall . . . be denied the
equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's
civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of
race, religion, sex, or ancestry."' The court recognized that Hawaii's
marriage statutes, by implicitly restricting the marital relation to one man
and one woman,' deny same-sex couples the option to marry, which
gives rise to an equal protection complaint."
DOH argued that same-sex couples were not encountering sex
discrimination when they were denied the option to marry; rather, the
63. Id. at 55. Duclos notes, however, that the ability to marry might lead to
increased court resolution of custody conflicts. This might result in the courts forming
a hierarchy of preferred parents, and placing lesbians and gay men low in that hierarchy.
Id. at 56-57.
64. Id. at 51.
65. Id. at 87.
66. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59.
67. Id. at 59 n.19.
68. For a discussion questioning whether these statutory bars present compelling
state reasons for state prohibition, see Ingram, supra note 10.
69. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60 (citing HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 5).
70. Id. at 60. Those statutes include HAW. REv. STAT. § 572-1, which restricts
marital relations to one male and one female in different sections: § 572-1(1) precludes
marriages between brother and sister, uncle and niece, and aunt and nephew; § 572-1(3)
forbids marriage between a man or woman who already has a living wife or husband; and
§ 572-1(7) refers to the man and woman desiring to marry in setting forth the requisites
for marriage ceremonies.
71. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60.
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denial was due to their "biologic inability as a couple to satisfy the
definition of the status to which they aspire."' The court rejected, as
circular and unpersuasive, this argument that "the right of persons of the
same sex to marry one another does not exist because marriage, by
definition and usage, means a special relationship between a man and a
woman."" Had the court followed its reasoning to its logical
conclusion, it also would have determined that the fundamental right to
marry includes same-sex marriages.
The court considered the previous same-sex marriage cases of Jones
v. Hallahan74 and Singer v. Hara" to help decide the case.76 In both
of those cases, the courts used definitional limitations to reject the
challenges to their state statutes. The Jones court held that "marriage has
always been considered as a union of a man and a woman. . . . It
appears to us that appellants are prevented from marrying . . . by their
own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is defined....
In substance, the relationship proposed by the appellants does not
authorize the issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is
72. Id. at 61 (quoting Respondent's Answering Brief at 21).
73. Id. at 61 (quoting Respondent's Brief at 7).
74. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). Two lesbians challenged the State of
Kentucky's refusal to issue a marriage license to them as violating their right to marry,
their right of association, and their right to free exercise of religion. They characterized
the denial as constituting cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 589.
75. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974).
Two gay men challenged the State of Washington's refusal to grant them a marriage
license, arguing that Washington's statutes did not prohibit same-sex marriages. The
plaintiffs also argued that the denial of a marriage license violated Washington's equal
rights amendment as well as the Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 1188-89.
76. The court rejected two other same-sex marriage cases cited by Lewin as not
controlling. Id. at 61. The court rejected Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn.
1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), because it involved interpretation of Minnesota
statutes. The Baker court found that the Minnesota statute prohibited same-sex marriage
without violating the U.S. Constitution, and raised no state constitutional questions. The
Baehr court also rejected DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
because DeSanto held that common law same-sex marriage did not exist in Pennsylvania.
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.
Additional cases denying recognition of same-sex marriage include: McConnell v.
Nooner, 547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Ca.
1980), afftd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); In re Estate
of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Sur. Ct. 1990), aff'd, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div.
1993), appeal dismissed by 624 N.E.2d 696 (N.Y. 1993); Anonymous v. Anonymous,
325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Dean v. Barry, C.A. No. 90-13892 (D.C. Super.
1991); see also Dan Levy, Gay Couple Fight for Right to Wed, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 9,
1992, at A18 (detailing Craig Dean and Patrick Gill's losing attempt to marry in the
District of Columbia).
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
not a marriage."' The Singer court found that the state's statutes were
not defective under either the United States Constitution or the
Washington Constitution because: "Appellants were not denied a marriage
license because of their sex; rather, they were denied a marriage license
because of the nature of marriage itself."78
The Baehr court, in the clearest language possible, rejected this
"exercise in tortured and conclusory sophistry."' It noted that only by
using this sophistry were the other courts "relieved" of the virtually
impossible task of trying to distinguish Loving v. Virginia from the
current case. In Loving, the United States Supreme Court struck down
Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws which prohibited interracial marriages.
The trial court in Loving, similar to the trial courts in Jones and Singer,
used a definitional defect as its rationale for upholding the statute. The
court stated that divine providence had not intended that the marriage state
extend to interracial unions:"
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow,
malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And
but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no
cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.'
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court struck down the
Virginia law on equal protection and due process grounds. The Court
found that the law rested solely on racial distinctions.' Because laws
based on racial classifications were entitled to the "most rigid scrutiny"
and because there was "patently no legitimate overriding purpose
independent of invidious discrimination" to justify the classification, the
Court had "no doubt" that restricting the freedom to marry based on race
violated the Equal Protection Clause."
The Baehr court used Loving to "discredit the reasoning of Jones and
unmask the tautological and circular nature of Lewin's argument" with
regard to the Hawaii marriage statute.85 The Virginia courts had
declared that interracial marriage could not exist because "it had
77. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61 (quoting Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589-90).
78. Id. at 63 (quoting Singer, 522 P.2d at 1196).
79. Id.
80. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
81. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 62 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 3).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 62 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 11).
84. Id. at 62-63.
85. Id. at 63.
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theretofore never been the 'custom' of the state to recognize mixed
marriages, marriage 'always' having been construed to presuppose a
different configuration."' Although a similar argument against same-
sex marriage had convinced the courts in Jones and Singer, the Baehr
court rejected this contention when advanced by Lewin. The Baehr
plurality also used the Loving Court's rationale to discredit Justice Heen's
dissent. Just as the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the notion that "equal
application" of the anti-miscegenation statute to both whites and blacks
immunized the statute from running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause,
the Baehr plurality simply substituted "sex" for "race" to reject Heen's
argument that, because the statutes denying same-sex marriage applied to
both men and women, they were not based on sex discriminationY
The court determined that "strict scrutiny" review should be used
when laws classify on the basis of "suspect categories.""5 After finding
that section 572-1 regulated marital status on the basis of the applicants'
sex,' the Baehr court decided, for the first time, that under Hawaii's
constitution, sex should be treated as a suspect category entitled to strict
scrutiny review.' Having made that decision, the court held "that (1)
HRS § 572-1 is presumed to be unconstitutional (2) unless Lewin, as an
agent of the State of Hawaii, can show that (a) the statute's sex-based
classification is justified by compelling state interests and (b) the statute
86. Id.
87. Id. at 68.
88. Id. at 63-64.
89. Id. at 64. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 states:
(1) The respective parties do not stand in relation to each other of
ancestor and descendant of any degree whatsoever, brother and
sister of the half as well as to the whole blood, uncle and niece,
aunt and nephew, whether the relationship is legitimate or
illegitimate;
(3) The man does not at the time have any lawful wife living and that
the woman does not at the time have any lawful husband living;
(7) The marriage ceremony be performed in the State by a person or
society with a valid license to solemnize marriages and the man
and the woman to be married and the person performing the
marriage ceremony be all physically present at the same place and
time for the marriage ceremony.
90. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67. The court held that it was time "to resolve once and
for all" the question of whether sex was a suspect category. It held that "sex is a 'suspect
category' for purposes of equal protection analysis under article l, section 5 of the Hawaii
Constitution and that HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 is subject to the 'strict scrutiny' test."
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is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of the applicant
couples' constitutional rights.""1
No one can deny that the Baehr court took a courageous step forward
in welcoming lesbians and gay men toward full acceptance by society.'
Had the court taken the next logical step from its equal protection
holding, it would have moved lesbians and gay men even further down
the path of acceptance. On equal protection grounds, the court had the
courage to reject the "tortured" reasoning which had supported
discrimination against same-sex marriage in the past: that lesbians and gay
men could not fit within the only marriage configuration ever recognized
91. Id. Since the Baehr court's remand to the trial court, the Hawaii legislature
has passed Act 217, H.B. 2312, which went into effect after the Governor's approval of
the bill on June 22, 1994. Section 8 states that the act applies retroactively to any
marriage license application pending or rejected by the Department of Health before the
effective date of the act. Act of June 22, 1994, No. 217, § 8, 1994 Haw. Laws
[hereinafter Act 2171. Therefore, it claims to control the plaintiffs' applications in this
case.
The Hawaii legislature amended HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 to read: "In order to
make valid the marriage contract, which shall be only between a man and a woman, it
shall be necessary that .... " before returning to the statute's original language. Id. §
1.
The Hawaii legislature, in § 1, also lectures the supreme court about incorrectly
making policy decisions better decided by the legislature, and about incorrectly
interpreting the Hawaii marriage statutes to apply to same-sex couples. The remaining
portion of its lecture effectively rejects the plurality's analysis and applauds and adopts
the dissent's analysis. The legislative lecture concludes with a statement that one purpose
of the Act, among others, is to
expressly reiterate the original intent of the legislature in enacting section 572-
1, Hawaii Revised Statutes, that that section, and all of Hawaii's marriage
licensing statutes, both originally and presently are intended to apply only to
male-female, not same-sex couples, and that this application of the statute is
consistent with Article I, section 5, of the Hawaii Constitution ....
Id. § 1. It concludes by directing the legislature to review and interpret Hawaii's
marriage statutes in light of the legislative findings contained in Act 217.
It is difficult to believe that this legislative posturing will have any impact on the
trial court on remand. Although it is clearly within the legislature's province to clarify
its intent, that intent still seems to violate the Hawaii Constitution's prohibition of sex
discrimination. For while the legislature can claim that sex discrimination was not behind
its restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples, it is difficult to see that restriction as
anything short of discrimination. The Baehr court was able to ascertain that
discriminatory intent before Act 217's amendment and nothing in the Act lessens the
statute's discriminatory result.
92. Many lesbians and gay men do not seek this full acceptance, fearing that it
will "domesticate" us and bring us under society's control. For an excellent analysis of
this concern of "domestication" as it relates to lesbians and marriage, see RUTHANN
ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 18-19, 126-27
(1992).
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in the United States, that of requiring one man and one woman, and that
this "custom" was reason enough to forbid present expansion beyond that
configuration." While recognizing that constitutional law often
mandates that "customs change with an evolving social order"14 in
relation to equal protection jurisprudence, the court was seemingly unable
to move beyond those same customs and history when considering
whether same-sex couples had a fundamental right to marry.95
B. Prohibiting Same-Sex Marriage Does Not Violate the Fundamental
Right to Marry
The Hawaii Supreme Court recognized the well-established right of
personal privacy or a guarantee of certain zones of privacy implicit in the
United States Constitution," and noted that article I, section 6 of the
Hawaii Constitution expressly states that "[t]he right of the people to
privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of
93. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
94. Id.
95. Perhaps the Baehr court was relying on the difference between the equal
protection clause and the due process clause explicated by Cass Sunstein in his article,
Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process
and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988). In that article, Sunstein argues
that the "Due Process Clause is backward-looking; a large part of its reach is defined by
reference to tradition. . . . The Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, is grounded in a
norm of equality that operates largely as a critique of traditional practices." Id. at 1179.
However, Sunstein notes that this distinction does not completely explain the court's
privacy jurisprudence:
Traditions can be described as varying levels of generality. There may well
be, for example, a tradition of respect for intimate association. The
application of that tradition has hardly been consistent, however, and the hard
cases arise when the general tradition of respect meets a particular context
[such as same-sex marriage] in which the general tradition has been repudiated
and, to that extent, does not exist at all.
Id. at 1173. In those "hard cases," Sunstein argues that tradition cannot be controlling
and normative inquiry must be made into how to characterize the relevant tradition. Id.
Sunstein finds the Bowers decision "troublesome," especially considering the tradition
underlying Roe and Griswold. Id. at 1173-74. For the same reason, this Article argues
that the Baehr court mistakenly considered whether a fundamental right to same-sex
marriage exists, rather than asking the more general question of whether there is a
fundamental right to marry. See also Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1979). For an example of the
disagreement between Justice Scalia and Justice Brennan on the correct level of generality
when considering traditions in a family law context, compare Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 122-27 (1989) (Scalia, J.) with id. at 137-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55.
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a compelling state interest" because privacy is a fundamental right.'
The court stated, that, at a minimum, the Hawaii Constitution
"encompasses all of the fundamental rights expressly recognized as being
subsumed within the privacy protections of the United States
Constitution."" The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the right to
marry is part of the fundamental right of privacy implicit in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.'
In discussing whether the right to marry extends to same-sex couples,
the Baehr court turned to federal cases for guidance10 The court
primarily reviewed the Supreme Court's decisions in Skinner ex rel.
Williams v. Oklahoma 1' and Zablocki v. Redhail.1 2 The Skinner
Court stated that, in considering marriage, it was reflecting on one of our
most basic civil rights."m The Baehr court concluded that the Supreme
Court was "contemplating unions between men and women when it ruled
that the right to marry was fundamental." 1" It then used Zablocki to
document the evolution of the federally recognized fundamental right to
marry, moving from Maynard v. Hill's"°5 characterization of marriage
as "the most important relation in life""° and the "foundation of the
family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization
nor progress";"°7 to Meyer v. Nebraska's" statement that marriage
is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause; °9
97. Id. The Hawaii Constitutional Convention of 1978 clearly stated that it was
expressly including a right to privacy in its constitution to avoid the confusion over the
source of the right and its existence. This confusion has plagued discussions of whether
the U.S. Constitution includes such a privacy right. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)).
100. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55.
101. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
102. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
103. Actually, the Skinner Court considered it to be a basic civil right of men.
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
104. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56. The court did not find this surprising considering that
at the time, none of the states sanctioned any other marriage configuration. id. However,
the assumption that same-sex couples cannot procreate, and thus can be denied this 'basic
civil right," is false for two reasons. First, heterosexuals who cannot procreate are not
denied the opportunity to marry. Second, same-sex couples can "procreate" through
alternate avenues, including sperm donation, surrogacy, and egg donation. Chris Keller,
Comment, Divining the Priest: A Case Comment on Baehr v. Lewin, 12 LAW & INEQ.
J. 501, 517 (1994).
105. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
106. Id. at 205.
107. Id. at 211.
108. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
109. Id. at 399.
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and to Skinner's conclusion that marriage is "fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race."110
The Baehr court did not find it surprising that "the decision to
mary" has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions
relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family
relationships."' In fact, the court found that "it would make little sense
to recognize a right of privacy with respect to those other matters of
family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship
that is the foundation of the family in our society."" 2
The court made an analytical error when it found that "[i]mplicit in
the Zablocki Court's link between the right to marry, on the one hand,
and the fundamental rights of procreation, childbirth, abortion, and child
rearing, on the other, is the assumption that the one is simply the logical
predicate of the others.""' It then concluded that the fundamental right
to marry contemplates unions between men and women, presumably
because procreation, childbirth, and child rearing are not "logical" steps
following same-sex marriage."
The court questioned whether it should extend the fundamental right
to marry beyond its current bounds, which the court found to be limited
to opposite-sex couples, to include same-sex couples. It stated, and
asserted that the plaintiffs agreed, that the court was being asked to
recognize a new fundamental right.1 5 While recognizing that it had the
authority to so interpret the Hawaii Constitution,"6 the court followed
its earlier precedent to determine that the privacy right in the Hawaii
Constitution was similar to the federal privacy right. The court found
that no "'purpose to lend talismanic effect' to abstract phrases such as
110. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
111. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56 (emphasis added).
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 56. For a more detailed discussion of the Court's error in linking the
right to marry with procreation, see Keller, supra note 104, at 516-23. For a discussion
of the inconsistent theological basis for the claim that procreative purpose is the sole
legitimation for sexual relations between husband and wife, see BOSWELL, supra note 12,
at xxi.
114. This assumption is simply incorrect. Currently, a lesbian "baby boom" has
been growing around the country; thousands of lesbians are having children, many of
them with their partners in families that look quite similar to the traditional nuclear
family. Barbara J. Cox, Love Makes a Family-Nothing More, Nothing Less. How the
Judicial System Has Refused to Protect Nonlegal Parents in Alternative Families, 8 J.L.
& POLmcs 5, 6 n.7 (1991). Additionally, it has been estimated that the number of
children living with a lesbian or gay parent ranges from one to six million. Id. For a
further discussion of lesbian parents and their children, see PHYLLIS BURKE, FAMILY
VALUES: Two Moms AND THEIR SON (1993).
115. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57.
116. Id.
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'intimate decision' or 'personal autonomy' [could] be inferred from [the
Hawaii Constitution].""'
In determining what the fundamental right to privacy meant under the
Hawaii Constitution, the Hawaii Supreme Court looked again to U.S.
Supreme Court cases for assistance. Those cases defined the fundamental
right to privacy as "'deal[ing] with a right . . . older than the Bill of
Rights'""' which was given substance by looking to the "'traditions and
[collective] conscience of our people' to determine whether a
principle is 'so rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental.'"' 9
The inquiry was whether the right in question "is of such a character that
it cannot be denied without violating those 'fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions .... 20
The Baehr court then stated that a right to same-sex marriage was not
so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of our people.121
It also did not believe that a right to same-sex marriage was "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would
exist if it were sacrificed."" Thus, same-sex couples who apply for
marriage licenses do not have a fundamental right to same-sex marriage
arising out of the Hawaii Constitution's articulated right to privacy or its
due process clause."
In finding that the fundamental right to marry is restricted to
opposite-sex couples, the Hawaii Supreme Court made the same error that
the United States Supreme Court made in Bowers v. Hardwick." Just
as the Bowers Court erred by focusing on the existence of a fundamental
right to homosexual sodomy, instead of recognizing a fundamental right
to privacy in one's choice of sexual partners," so too did the Baehr
117. Id. at 57 (quoting State v. Mueller, 671 P.2d 1351, 1360 (Haw. 1983)).
118. Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
119. Id. (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring)) (citations
omitted). For a criticism of using only the "traditions and collective conscience" test to
determine fundamental rights, see Keller, supra note 104, at 523-32.
120. Id. (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring)) (citations
omitted).
121. Id. at 57. Justice Scalia has made this same argument in U.S. Supreme Court
cases. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
122. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57. This reference is to those freedoms which are
protected against state infringement by way of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
123. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57.
124. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
125. For a list of articles criticizing the Bowers decision, see Barbara J. Cox,
Refocusing Abortion Jurisprudence to Include the Woman: A Response to Bopp and
Coleson and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 543, 575
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court err by focusing on the existence of a fundamental right to same-sex
marriage, instead of applying the already recognized fundamental right to
marry to same-sex couples."
Neither court understood that what has been protected under United
States Supreme Court due process and right-to-privacy precedent is not
any particular practice or act, but instead the decision to take certain
actions. As argued elsewhere concerning the right to choose an abortion,
both the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause and the right to
privacy include the freedom to choose actions significantly less intrusive
on an individual's liberty and privacy than whether to enter into a same-
sex marriage.127
This right to make intimate decisions has been repeatedly recognized
by the United States Supreme Court throughout its explication of the Due
Process Clause's liberty interest. From Meyer v. Nebraska,'2 where
the Court protected the right to teach children languages other than
English;' 2 to Pierce v. Society of Sisters," where the Court
protected the liberty of parents to make choices concerning the education
of their children;' to Loving v. Virginia,32  where the Court
protected the "freedom of choice to marry [un]restricted by invidious
racial discrimination"; 33 to Moore v. City of East Cleveland,"M where
the Court noted that it had long protected "freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life"; 3s to Roe v. Wade,"3 where the
Court protected a woman's right to choose whether to have an
abortion;'37 the Court has been less concerned with the specific practice
that was statutorily regulated than it was with considering the importance
of the choice in expressing an individual's liberty.
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing and education. . . . These
n.201.
126. But see supra note 95.
127. Cox, supra note 125, at 563-65, 572-73.
128. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
129. Id. at 400.
130. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
131. Id. at 534-35.
132. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
133. Id. at 12.
134. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
135. Id. at 499 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40
(1974)).
136. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
137. Id. at 153.
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matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State. 13
This focus on the decision, rather than the practice, also carries over
into the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence. From Griswold v.
Connecticut, where the Court protected the right of a married couple
to decide whether to use contraceptives;'" to Eisenstadt v. Baird,41
where the Court extended the right to decide whether "to bear or beget
a child" to unmarried individuals; to Stanley v. Georgia," where
the Court acknowledged the individual's right to decide what to read or
observe;'" to Roe v. Wade,"4 where the Court recognized that the
right of privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy"; " the Court has focused
on whether the decision, not the practice, fell within the area protected by
the right of privacy.
Reviewing the Supreme Court's jurisprudence establishes that the
Baehr court made the same error as the Bowers Court in focusing too
closely on the practice, instead of on the decision. In deciding whether
Georgia could prohibit a gay man from engaging in sodomy, the Bowers
Court focused on the historical prohibition of homosexual sodomy in
American history.'47 In writing for the Court, Justice White stated that
its previous privacy cases related to family, marriage, and procreation and
138. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) (citations
omitted); see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984) where
the Court stated that "[lit must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of
highly personal relationships a substantial amount of sanctuary from unjustified
interference by the State. . . . Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state
interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is
central to any concept of liberty."
139. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
140. Id. at 485.
141. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
142. Id. at 453.
143. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
144. Id. at 565.
145. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
146. Id. at 153.
147. 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986).
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no connection could be made between those familial activities and
homosexual sodomy.'
But the question in Bowers should not have been whether homosexual
sodomy was prohibited historically. Instead, the question should have
been whether the Constitution protects the individual's decision to engage
in homosexual sodomy. "That fundamental choice is protected by the
right to privacy, just as the choice whether to possess obscene materials
in one's home,149 the choice whether to use contraceptives,'Im the
choice to marry interracially," and the choice to have an abortion,"
among others, are protected by the privacy right." 3
Both Justices Blackmun and Stevens, dissenting in Bowers, noted this
misconstruction of the constitutional question. Justice Blackmun
emphasized that earlier privacy cases protected just these sorts of
decisions."s He wrote:
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way
through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests,
in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many "right"
ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the
richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an
individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely
personal bonds. 5
Justice Stevens also emphasized that fundamental decisions are protected
by the privacy right. He underscored the need to protect every
individual's right to make "certain unusually important decisions" and to
respect "the dignity of individual choice," thereby rejecting the notion
that such choices belong only to heterosexuals."s
Thus, too, in Baehr, the question should not have been whether
"same-sex couples possess a fundamental right to marry. " "' It should
have been whether individuals possess a fundamental right to choose to
148. Id. at 186-91.
149. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
150. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
151. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
152. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
153. Cox, supra note 125, at 576.
154. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 205.
156. Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and
Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REv. 521, 535 (1989) (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 217-19
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
157. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57.
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marry, a choice which had traditionally been improperly restricted to
opposite-sex couples. The court should not have considered whether a
right to same-sex marriage is "so rooted in the traditions and collective
conscience of our people" nor whether it was "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. " "'8 Instead, it should have asked whether the right to
marriage, in and of itself, was "so rooted" and "implicit." By asking that
question, the court would have answered "yes" because no other
unrelated adults without any independent marriage bar s are forbidden
this fundamental right.
While it was easy for the Baehr court to phrase the question so as to
preclude recognizing same-sex marriages as fundamental, it is perplexing
why it went to the effort to do so. While discussing the equal protection
question, it rejected the argument that "the right of persons of the same
sex to marry one another does not exist because marriage, by definition
and usage, means a special relationship between a man and a
woman. " " In fact, it had earlier found this argument to be "circular
and unpersuasive."' It is therefore difficult to understand why the
Baehr court did not also find limiting the fundamental right to marry to
opposite-sex couples to be "circular and unpersuasive."
If, under an equal protection analysis, it is circular and unpersuasive
to argue that, by its very definition, marriage is prohibited for same-sex
couples because of "their biologic inability as a couple to satisfy the
definition of the status to which they aspire," 62 how can it be
convincing when the court makes that same argument in relation to
fundamental rights by finding that same-sex marriage is not rooted in the
traditions and conscience of society?" Given the court's earlier
analysis, it would seem that the only reason same-sex marriage has not
been rooted in the traditions and conscience of society is because courts
have rejected the notion that a same-sex couple could satisfy the
definitional requirements for marriage. Clearly, marriages of all other
types, except those statutorily barred, and until recently, miscegenous
marriages, are rooted in the traditions and conscience of society simply
because they fit the prevailing requisite definition. By fitting that
definition, such marriages became protected as fundamental. Were it not
for years of restrictive definitions of marriage that required both a man
and a woman, it is conceivable that marriage between same-sex couples
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying, text (discussing various statutory
bars against marriage for reasons of incest, age, disease, and bigamy).
160. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. But see supra note 95.
1060
Same-Sex. Marriages
could have flourished, just as opposite-sex marriages flourished.61 If
the court can understand that an argument for opposite-sex marriage alone
is circular and unpersuasive because it employs a needlessly restrictive
definition, how can it fail to see that it is only the restrictive definition
itself that has prevented same-sex marriage from locating its roots deep
within the collective conscience?
To accept the argument within one context, while rejecting it in the
other, indicates that perhaps the court had reached a line beyond which
it could not go. While it may have been within the court's ability to
recognize that marriage laws restricted to opposite-sex couples violate
Hawaii's equal protection clause, it could not imagine that those same
restrictive marriage laws also violate the fundamental right to marry.
Perhaps the notion that same-sex marriage could be "fundamental" was
too disturbing. Perhaps the court could not conceive that "neither liberty
nor justice would exist if [same-sex marriage] were sacrificed.""
Whatever its reasons, the court, while at long last taking a step toward
welcoming gay men and lesbians into the circle of people entitled to
constitutional protection, could not quite welcome us with open arms and
full acceptance. While implicitly recognizing the clear discriminatory
nature of the opposite-sex marriage laws under the equal protection
clause, the court may have needed to provide the state another chance to
prevent this welcoming. By remanding and allowing the state to show a
compelling state interest and narrowly drawn statute, the court was able
to avoid deciding, at least initially, whether gay men and lesbians can
achieve this basic right in our society."
164. See Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values:
Searchingfor the Hidden Determinants ofBowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087
n.78 (1988); Eskridge, supra note 12.
165. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57.
166. The court may continue to be able to avoid this decision, given the factual
requirements the plaintiffs will have to address according to Justice Bums' concurring
opinion. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. Establishing that homosexuality
is "biologically fated" may prove difficult indeed and, if Bums insists on such a factual
finding before finding sex discrimination, the plaintiffs' case may not succeed. However,
it is unclear what the membership of the Hawaii Supreme Court will be should another
appeal result from the trial court's decision. On the motion for reconsideration, an
additional Justice, Nakayama, had taken the place of Justice Hayashi, and Bums'
continuity on the bench is uncertain because he was appointed in place of Justice Lum,
who had been recused but who had subsequently retired. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 74.
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II. STATUTORY AND THEORETICAL GUIDANCE ON RECOGNIZING THE
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Once Hawaii protects the right of same-sex couples to marry, or,
should the Baehr remand not conclude with this result, some other state
recognizes same-sex marriage first, the question will remain as to what
extent an out-of-state same-sex marriage by one state's domiciliaries will
be validated upon the couple's return to that domicile. It is to that
question that this Article now turns. To reduce complexity and to
consider the most likely scenario, the final two Parts will limit discussion
of their same-sex marriage and choice-of-law to the following facts.
Amy and Betty or Andy and Barry travel from their home state to
Hawaii to marry following recognition of same-sex marriage upon
favorable conclusion of the Baehr case. Following their marriage and
honeymoon in Hawaii, they return to their domicile and assert their
marital status in that state. 167 At some point, a benefit provider (be it
a health insurance carrier, health club owner, workers' compensation
board, or other institution) will refuse to accept that assertion. Then the
couples will proceed to litigate their marital status within their
167. The author recognizes that, by using two domiciliaries from one state, rather
than, for example, using a domiciliary from Hawaii and one from another state, this
Article does not consider a theoretically complex choice-of-law question. The other
example would be more theoretically complex because then at least two states would have
undeniably strong interests involved. Rather than seek an answer to that more theoretical
question, this Article chooses to focus on what will be the most commonly occurring
scenario, that of two domiciliaries from one state traveling to another state, such as
Hawaii, to marry, and then returning to their domicile. Until states start to recognize or
permit same-sex marriage, the other scenario is unlikely to happen regularly.
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domicile.'" Whether their marriage will be recognized is questionable,
regardless of whether controlled by statute or common law theory.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides a system of
analysis for courts seeking to resolve this question of first impression."69
Although some commentators object to the Second Restatement's position
on marriage 1 -numerous other theories will be explored later in this
Article 171-the Second Restatement's usefulness at this point is to
indicate an organization for analyzing how courts in various jurisdictions
will address same-sex marriage. Section 283 states that:
168. Some commentators object to the idea that marital status is "universal" and
believe that one's marital status should be determined on an issue-by-issue basis, after
considering the policies behind each particular incident of marriage. Hans W. Baade,
Marriage and Divorce in American Conflicts Law: Governmental-Interests Analysis and
the Restatement (Second), 72 COLuM. L. REv. 329, 356-57 (1972); David E. Engdahl,
Proposal for a Benign Revolution in Marriage Law and Marriage Conflicts Law, 55 IOWA
L. REV. 56, 108-10 (1969); J. David Fine, The Application of Issue-Analysis to Choice
of Law Involving Family Law Matters in the United States, 26 LoY. L. REv. 31 (1980);
Reese, supra note 23, at 952, 965. This analysis would be perfectly acceptable in many
situations and conforms to the factual reality of the way in which most cases arise.
The problem with this analysis in the situation as given, however, is that our couple
is concerned about their "status"; that is, whether in fact they are married for all
purposes. Some courts have resolved the choice-of-law problem by finding a person to
be a spouse for some purposes, for example, intestate succession, but not for others, such
as cohabitation. See In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Ct. App.
1948) (holding that public policy would not be affected by dividing property between
polygamous wives validly married abroad, but would be affected by cohabitation in the
state); Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140, 142 (Miss. 1948) (recognizing interracial couple's
marriage for purposes of intestate succession but not for in-state cohabitation); and other
cases cited in Engdahl, supra, at 102 nn.218-26. This piecemeal response is unacceptable
in same-sex marriage cases.
Litigating marital recognition for a specific incident of marriage after one spouse has
already died, as occurred in the above cases, is a legitimate exercise. In such situations,
considering the policies behind each incident could more easily lead to recognition of the
marriage, where normally, universal recognition would be denied, because the policy
behind granting the incident would not be "offended" by recognizing the marriage. But
if our couple is denied the opportunity to determine their "universal" marital status for
all incidents of marriage, they must relitigate their marital status repeatedly as they request
recognition of their marriage for each incident. This is an untenable prospect and would
be unacceptable for other couples. In fact, our couple may choose to bring a declaratory
judgment action upon returning to their domicile to determine their marital status for all
purposes. See Reese, supra note 23, at 953.
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTOF LAws (1971) [hereinafter SECOND
RESTATEMENT].
170. See, e.g., Baade, supra note 168; Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Miscegenation in
the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 45 CORNELL L.Q.
659 (1960).
171. See infra parts II.C, III.A.
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(1) The validity of marriage will be determined by the
local law of the state which, with respect to the
particular issue, has the most significant relationship
to the spouses and the marriage under the principles
stated in § 6.
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the
state where the marriage was contracted will
everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates
the strong public policy of another state which had the
most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriage at the time of the marriage. 7 2
Section 6 states that "A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will
follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law."' 3
When no statutory directive exists, the court should consider various
factors relevant to the choice-of-law to determine the state with the "most
significant relationship" to the issue.74
Thus, this Part will begin, as the courts must do, by considering the
statutory directives of the various states in determining whether our
couple's marriage will be validated within their domicile. " When no
statutory directive exists, the courts of the state with the "most significant
relationship," usually the parties' domicile, will consider choice-of-law
theories to resolve whether to recognize the marriage which was valid
where celebrated.
Courts considering this issue should begin by recognizing the general
rule preferring validation of marriages, which exists with an
"overwhelming tendency" in the United States.176 Under this rule,
marriages will be found valid if there is any reasonable basis for doing
172. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 169, § 283.
173. Id. § 6(1).
174. Id. § 6(2). Those factors include: (a) the needs of the interstate and
international systems; (b) the relevant policies of the forum; (c) the relevant policies of
other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue; (d) the protection of the parties' justified expectations; (e) the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity
of result; and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Id.
175. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 271 (1966), states that if the forum's legislature has enacted a
choice-of-law statute, forum courts will follow it, once they determine what it means.
Willis L.M. Reese also notes that a marriage validation statute, such as § 210 of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, would require a court to uphold a foreign marriage.
Reese, supra note 23, at 963; see infra parts II.A, II.B.
176. WILLIAM M. RicHmAN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 116,
at 362 (2d ed. 1993).
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so. 1" There are such strong policy reasons behind this rule that it has
become well entrenched in the substantive law of all the states." "The
validation rule confirms the parties' expectations, it provides stability in
an area where stability (because of children and property) is very
important, and it avoids the potentially hideous problems that would arise
if the legality of a marriage varied from state to state."' The parties'
expectations arise from the fact that the married couple needs to know
"reliably and certainly, and at once, whether they are married or
not."s' Additionally, the concern about uncertainty arises either
because the couple is married in one state and not another or because the
couple's marital status is ambiguous during the pursuit of litigation to
determine it. "I
Despite this overwhelming tendency to validate the marriage, our
same-sex couple will remain unsure whether their marriage will be
recognized, due to courts' discretion to refuse recognition on public
policy grounds. Given this inherent uncertainty, this Part tries to provide
guidance gleaned from statutes and choice-of-law theories, to determine
the validity of our couple's marriage.
The first sub-part considers statutory choice-of-law rules that follow
section 210 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act or other statutes
which provide that out-of-state marriages are valid if valid where
contracted." The second sub-part reviews the states that have evasion
statutes, many adopted during the lifetime of the Uniform Marriage
Evasion Law," which nullify out-of-state marriages by domiciliaries
if the marriage would be prohibited within the state.'" The third sub-
part attempts to determine how courts will resolve questions of the
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. ROBERT A. LEFLAR. ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 220, at 605 (4th
ed. 1986).
181. Id.
182. Fine, supra note 168, at 38 n.13. Section 210 provides that "[a]U marriages
contracted . . . outside this state, that were valid at the time of the contract or
subsequently validated by the laws of the place in which they were contracted or by the
domicile of the parties, are valid in this State." Id.
183. J. Philip Johnson, Note, The Validity of a Marriage Under the Conflict of
Laws, 38 N.D. L. REv. 442, 454 (1962). That Act was adopted by only five states
before the Act was withdrawn in 1943 because of its limited adoption. Id. Those states
are Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id. at 454 n.77.
184. Id. The states which adopted § 1 of the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act
usually also adopted § 2, which nullifies marriages by nonresidents within the state when
their own domicile's law would have declared the marriage void. ld. However, as of
1980, there were no reported cases applying § 2. Fine, supra note 168, at 37 n.12.
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validity of same-sex marriages celebrated out-of-state when the parties
return to their domicile in situations unguided by statutory directives. It
surveys the major choice-of-law theories in use today and considers what
result would occur in courts using them to resolve this question. After
considering both the statutory directives and the theoretical guidance, one
discovers that courts retain significant leeway to resolve the issue
regardless of these directives and guidance.
A. Same-Sex Marriage and Uniform Marriage/Divorce Act Section 210
Numerous states have adopted some form of section 210 of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which was intended to validate
marriages celebrated outside a state within the adopting state. There are
some variations in the statutory language. Colorado has a statute which,
like most other states, simply incorporates the language from the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act:
All marriages contracted within this state prior to January 1,
1974, or outside this state that were valid at the time of the
contract or subsequently validated by the laws of the place in
which they were contracted or by the domicile of the parties are
valid in this state. 185
Other jurisdictions with essentially similar statutes include Arkansas, 8 6
California, 8 7  Connecticut, 8 ' the District of Columbia, 89
185. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-112 (West 1991).
186. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-107 (Michie 1993) ("All marriages contracted
outside this state which would be valid by the laws of the state or country in which the
marriages were consummated and in which the parties then actually resided shall be valid
in all the courts in this state.") (emphasis added). The underlined portion of the statute
may cause difficulty for our couple, assuming they did not actually reside in Hawaii
before returning to Arkansas.
187. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308 (West 1994) ("A marriage contracted outside this
state that would be valid by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was
contracted is valid in this state.").
188. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-24a (West 1993 & Supp. 1994) ("All
marriages celebrated before October 1, 1993, otherwise valid except that the license for
any such marriage was issued in a town other than the town in which such marriage was
celebrated, are validated."). Although this statute does not explicitly include out-of-state
marriages, presumably it would apply to them.
189. D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-105 (1993) ("If any marriage declared illegal by the
foregoing sections shall be entered into in another jurisdiction by persons having and
retaining their domicile in the District of Columbia, such marriage shall be deemed
illegal, and may be decreed to be void in said District in the same manner as if it had
been celebrated therein.").
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Hawaii, 9 ' Idaho, 9' Kansas,' 92  Kentucky,' Michigan, 94
Minnesota, 95  Montana,'" Nebraska, 97  New Mexico,'" South
Dakota,' Utah,' Virginia,"' and Wyoming.' Illinois'
variation declares all marriages that are valid where contracted are valid
190. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-3 (1993) ("Marriages legal in the country where
contracted shall be held legal in the courts of the State.").
191. IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (1983) ("All marriages contracted without this state,
which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are
valid in this state.").
192. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-115 (1992) ("All marriages contracted without this
state, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted,
shall be valid in all courts and places in this state.").
193. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.040 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993) ("If any
resident of this state marries in another state, the marriage shall be valid here if valid in
the state where solemnized.").
194. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551-271 (West 1989) ("All marriages heretofore
contracted by residents of this state and who were, at the time of such marriages, legally
competent to contract marriage according to the laws of this state ... are hereby declared
to be and remain valid and binding marriages under the laws of this state to the same
effect and extent as if solemnized within this state and according to the laws thereof.").
195. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.20 (West 1990) ("All marriages contracted within
this state prior to March 1, 1979 or outside this state that were valid at the time of the
contract or subsequently validated by the laws of the place in which they were contracted
or by the domicile of the parties are valid in this state.").
196. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-104 (1993) ("All marriages contracted within this
state prior to January 1, 1976, or outside the state, that were valid at the time of the
contract or subsequently validated by the laws of the place in which they were contracted
or by the domicile of the parties are valid in this state.").
197. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-117 (1988) ("All marriages contracted without this
state, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted,
shall be valid in all courts and places in this state.").
198. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-4 (Michie 1989) ("All marriages celebrated beyond
the limits of this state, which are valid according to the laws of the country wherein they
were celebrated or contracted, shall be likewise valid in this state, and shall have the same
force as if they had been celebrated in accordance with the laws in force in this state.").
199. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-1-38 (1992) ("All marriages contracted
without this state which would be valid by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the same
were contracted are valid in this state.").
200. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4 (Michie 1989) ("Marriages solemnized in any
other country, state or territory, if valid where solemnized, are valid here.").
201. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-371 (Michie 1990) ("All marriages heretofore
solemnized outside this Commonwealth by a minister authorized to celebrate the rites of
marriage in this Commonwealth, under a license issued in this Commonwealth, and
showing on the application therefor the place out of this Commonwealth, where said
marriage is to be performed shall be valid as if such marriage had been performed in this
Commonwealth."). Because this statute requires that the marriage license be issued by
Virginia, it is unlikely that our couple would be able to be validly married in Hawaii.
202. WYO. STAT. § 20-1-111 (1987) ("All marriage contracts which are valid by
the laws of the country in which contracted are valid in this state.").
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in Illinois, "except where contrary to the public policy of this State'
or where entered into to evade Illinois' marriage laws.' Louisiana's
version declares such marriages valid unless recognition would "violate
a strong public policy" of the applicable state.' Arizona's statute
indicates that marriages valid where contracted are valid in the state, but
also includes an evasion provision.' Georgia has a similar
combination of statutes.' Finally, North Dakota's statute validates
"[aill marriages contracted outside of this state" except "when residents
of this state contract a marriage in another state which is prohibited under
the laws of North Dakota."2 8
The comments to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act indicate
that section 210 was intended to validate marriages, even if the parties
would not have been allowed to marry in their domicile.' The
comment also states that section 210 "expressly fails to incorporate the
'strong public policy' exception of the Restatement [Second] and hence
may change the law in some jurisdictions. This section will preclude
invalidation of many marriages which would have been invalidated in the
past. "21 Thus, a strong argument can be made in states which have
adopted section 210 that they are prevented from contradicting the policy
behind that section-validation in all circumstances-by refusing to
recognize our couple's marriage on public policy grounds.
Many states with validation statutes also adopted section 207 of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which lists narrow prohibitions
against marriage. For example, the Colorado statute states:
203. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 5/213 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
204. id. para. 5/216.
205. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3520 (West 1994) ("A marriage that is valid in the
state where contracted, or in the state where the parties were first domiciled as husband
and wife, shall be treated as a valid marriage unless to do so would violate a strong public
policy of the state whose law is applicable to the particular issue under Article 3519.").
206. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-112 (1991). That statute also states that
marriages solemnized in another state of parties intending to reside in Arizona shall have
the same legal consequences and effect as if solemnized in that state (§ 25-112(B)) and
that parties residing in Arizona may not evade the laws of the state relating to marriage
by going to another state to solemnize the marriage (§ 25-112(c)). For a discussion of the
evasion section, see infra part ll.B.
207. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-214 (1991) ("All marriages solemnized in another state
by parties intending at the time to reside in this state shall have the same legal
consequences and effect as if solemnized in this state. Parties residing in this state may
not evade any of the laws of this state as to marriage by going into another state for the
solemnization of the marriage ceremony.").
208. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-08 (1991).
209. UNIF. MARRIAOE AND DIVORCE AcT § 210, 9A U.L.A. 176 (1987).
210. Id. (emphasis added).
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(1) The following marriages are prohibited:
(a) A marriage entered into prior to the
dissolution of an earlier marriage of one of
the parties except a currently valid marriage
between the parties;
(b) A marriage between an ancestor and a
descendent or between a brother and a
sister, whether the relationship is by the half
or the whole blood;
(c) A marriage between an uncle and a niece or
between an aunt and a nephew, whether the
relationship is by the half or the whole
blood, except as to marriages permitted by
the established custom of aboriginal
cultures.21
Colorado cases which apply these two sections of the Marriage and
Divorce Act are similar to those cases found in other states. Those cases
give out-of-state marriages clear acceptance, even when contrary to other
marriage statutes in the state, unless the marriages are expressly
prohibited. For example, in Payne v. Payne"' and Spencer v.
People,"' the Supreme Court of Colorado declared each challenged
marriage to be valid, because each was contracted in a state where it was
valid. This was so despite Colorado statutes which declared each
marriage to be either void or voidable for violating the age restrictions in
Colorado's marriage statutes. 214  Because the marriages were not
expressly prohibited, they were found to be valid. Cases from other
states listed above reached the same conclusion. 5
Similarly, because same-sex marriage has not been expressly
prohibited in most of these states, one could expect a court to reach the
same result with our couple. Of the states with validation statutes, only
211. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-110 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993).
212. 214 P.2d 495 (Colo. 1950).
213. 292 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1956).
214. Id. at 973; Payne, 214 P.2d at 497.
215. See Stevenson v. Gray, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 193 (1856) (holding that
Kentucky residents who went to another state to marry with express intent to evade
Kentucky laws were married if marriage valid where performed); Johnson v. Johnson, 104
N.W.2d 8 (N.D. 1960) (holding that validity of marriage contracted outside North Dakota
is determined by North Dakota law and, since not prohibited, is valid); cf In re Estate
of Enoch, 201 N.E.2d 682, 689 (111. App. Ct. 1964) (Illinois court refusing to recognize
a common-law marriage entered into in Colorado because of statutory prohibitions).
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Virginia and Utah expressly prohibit same-sex marriage2l' Whether
Minnesota and Kansas prohibit same-sex marriage is somewhat more
ambiguous due to the statutory language. 217  Arguably, with the
exception of Virginia and Utah, our couple could return to states with
validation statutes and persuasively argue that their marriage should also
be validated.
But even states with validation statutes may turn to public policy to
determine whether our couple's marriage would be valid.21 For
216. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1989 & Supp. 1994) ("The following marriages
are prohibited and declared void: . . . (5) between persons of the same sex."); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 1990) ("A marriage between persons of the same sex is
prohibited.").
For other states that prohibit same-sex marriage, see also IND. CODE ANN. § 31-7-1-
2 (West 1984) ("Only a female may marry a male. Only a male may marry a female.");
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 89 (West 1993) ("Persons of the same sex may not contract
marriage with each other."); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 2-201 (1991) ("Only a
marriage between a man and a woman is valid in this state."); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 1.01 (West 1993) ("A man and a woman desiring to enter into a ceremonial marriage
shall obtain a marriage license from the county clerk of any county of this state. A
license may not be issued for the marriage of persons of the same sex."). Most other
state statutes do not explicitly exclude same-sex marriages. Strasser, supra note 10, at
983.
217. The Minnesota statute is ambiguous. See MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (1990)
("Marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, is a civil contract between a man
and a woman, to which the consent of the parties, capable in law of contracting, is
essential.") (emphasis added). The emphasized language .was added to the statute
following the decision in Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). Strasser,
supra note 10, at 983 n.5. Although declaring that marriage is a contract between a man
and a woman, this statute does not prohibit same-sex marriage. Given the interpretation
of the validation cases affirming out-of-state marriages which are not prohibited by the
state, an argument could be made that our couple's same-sex marriage should be valid in
Minnesota. Kansas' statute is similar: "The marriage contract is to be considered in law
as a civil contract between two parties who are of opposite sex. . . ." KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-101 (1988).
Other states with similarly ambiguous statutes include: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-81r (West Supp. 1994) ("Nothing in [various statute sections outlawing
discrimination based on sexual orientation] ... shall be deemed or construed ... (4) to
authorize the recognition or the right of marriage between persons of the same sex.");
IDAHO CODE § 32-202 (1983) ("Any unmarried male. . . and any unmarried female
... are capable of consenting to and consummating marriage."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 122.020 (Michie 1993) ("A male and a female person . . . may be joined in
marriage."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (Anderson 1993) ("Male persons... and
female persons . . . may be joined in marriage."); WYo. STAT. § 20-1-101 (1994)
("Marriage is a civil contract between a male and a female person. . . ."). Because none
of these statutes expressly prohibit same-sex marriage, one could expect that they would
not inherently invalidate our couple's marriage.
218. But see supra notes 185-202 and accompanying text (indicating that those
states with validation statutes adopted as part of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
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example, even though Kentucky's statute does not indicate an exception
for public policy reasons, its courts have so interpreted the statute. In
Mangrum v. Mangrum,219 the court considered the validity of a
marriage between a sixteen-year-old male and a thirteen-year-old female.
In interpreting section 402.040 of the Kentucky Statutes, which provides
that if any Kentucky resident marries in another state, the marriage will
be valid in Kentucky if valid where solemnized, the court noted an
exception for marriages against the state's public policy.' Having
found that exception, the court nevertheless affirmed the marriage in that
case because it found that the Kentucky statute prohibiting marriage by
females under age fourteen"21 rendered those marriages voidable, not
void.t ' Because the marriage was simply voidable, the court held that
section 402.040 controlled and found the marriage to be valid.2
What will be particularly interesting is how courts in Kentucky and
Minnesota will determine the policy question of whether to follow their
statutes validating out-of-state marriages or their precedent refusing to
permit same-sex marriages.' The Kentucky situation is particularly
interesting given the recent mix of policy declarations. In Jones v.
Hallahan, the Kentucky court of appeals expressly stated that Kentucky
statutes do not prohibit marriages between persons of the same sex,
although they do contain references to a male and a female.' In fact,
the court went on to state that the appellants, two women, were not
prevented from marrying by the statutes of Kentucky, but instead by their
own incapability of entering into a marriage.' Given the lack of a
statutory prohibition, and therefore the lack of express legislative policy
to the contrary, and given the Kentucky statute declaring out-of-state
marriages to be valid,' one could argue that our couple, validly
are presumed to have eliminated any public policy exception to the validation of out-of-
state marriages).
219. 220 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. 1949).
220. Id. at 407. The court cited Damron v. Damron, 192 S.W.2d 741 (Ky. 1945)
and Gilbert v. Gilbert, 122 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1938).
221. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (Baldwin 1992).
222. Mangrum, 220 S.W.2d at 407.
223. Id. at 408.
224. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissedfor want of substantial federal question, 409
U.S. 810 (1972).
225. 501 S.W.2d at 589 & n.1.
226. Id. at 589.
227. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 402.040. Prohibited and void marriages include
certain incestuous marriages, those in which one partner is mentally disabled, bigamous
marriages, those not solemnized, and those in which one or both partners are under 18.
Same-sex marriages are not prohibited. Id.
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married in Hawaii, should be able to return to Kentucky and maintain a
valid marriage in that state.28'
This would seem particularly true given the recent expression of
Kentucky public policy found in the case of Commonwealth v.
Wasson.' In that case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky struck down
the state statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy as violating the
defendant's rights of privacy and equal protection under the state
constitution.' The court explained that its constitution imposed an
affirmative duty on the State to protect individual liberty,2" and stated
that "public indignation" may be codified into legislation only when
behavior produces "harmful consequences to others."1 2 Thus, the right
of privacy under the state constitution was broad enough to include
homosexual sexual conduct. 3  On equal protection grounds, gay men
and lesbians are "a separate and identifiable class for Kentucky
constitutional law analysis because no class of persons can be
discriminated against under the Kentucky constitution."' Even if a
majority of the state's citizens believe that homosexual conduct is
228. The question is more difficult in Minnesota because the legislature changed
its statute after the Baker case. Strasser, supra note 10, at 983. In Baker, the plaintiffs
argued that same-sex marriage was permitted under the state marriage statutes because the
legislature had not explicitly excluded it, but the court rejected their argument. 191
N.W.2d at 185-86. In 1977, the Minnesota legislature added the language that marriage
is "a civil contract between a man and a woman" to its marriage statute. MINN. STAT.
§ 517.01 (1990). Given the express statement that only opposite-sex couples can be
married in the state, despite the statute affirming out-of-state marriages as valid, one
would expect that Minnesota may follow its marriage restriction, rather than its choice-of-
law statute.
In Singer v. Hara, the Washington Court of Appeals also held that Washington
statutes did not permit same-sex marriage. 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
While not permitting the marriage, it also appears that Washington statutes do not prohibit
same-sex marriage, unless references to males and females can be seen as implying a
prohibition. id. at 1189 n.3, 1191.
229. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
230. Id. at 491-92.
231. id. at 492-93; see also Recent Case, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1370, 1371 (1993).
It also cited Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383 (Ky. 1909), in explaining that
"[tihe theory of [Kentucky's] government is to allow the largest liberty commensurate
with the public safety .... ITjhere is no room for that inquisitorial and protective spirit
which seeks to regulate the conduct of [people] in matters in themselves indifferent."
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 387.
232. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 496.
233. Id. at 491.
234. Id. at 500. The state did not establish a legitimate governmental interest
justifying a distinction based on sexual preference, and the court found the state's
attempted justifications based on connecting homosexuality with pedophilia, promiscuity,
and exhibitionism to be "outrageous." id. at 501.
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immoral, that belief does not provide a rational basis for criminalizing
gay men and lesbians' sexual activity. 5 Although the court's opinion
is somewhat murky in explaining the doctrinal basis for its decision,'
it seems to invite the type of question that our couple returning from
Hawaii would pose. Kentucky's statute and precedent validating out-of-
state marriages, the Kentucky court's prior finding of no statutory
prohibition against same-sex marriage, and its recent recognition of
privacy and equal protection rights for gay men and lesbians in Kentucky
point toward recognizing same-sex marriage, while its previous objection
to same-sex marriage points toward rejecting it. As can be seen from this
example, courts looking to discover a state's public policy on whether to
validate a same-sex marriage will have numerous expressions of policy to
consider.
Illinois has both a statute adopting Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act section 210 and a statute adopting the Uniform Marriage Evasion
Act.37 Perhaps there is no great inconsistency in adopting both of these
statutes given Illinois' additional language in its validation statute which
preserves the right of the state to exclude marriages, even though valid
in other states, that violate the express public policy of the state. Illinois
had a consistently strong policy against marriages which violate public
policy even before it adopted its version of the Uniform Marriage Evasion
Act. 38  The 1920 case of Lincoln v. Riley?9 noted that "the general
rule that a marriage valid where it is celebrated is valid everywhere has
two exceptions; viz., marriages which are contrary to the laws of nature,
as generally recognized by Christian countries, and those which are
declared by the positive law to have no validity."' The court went on
to cite Wilson v. Cook$" for the principle that marriages contracted in
violation of a statute "imposing upon its citizens an incapacity to contract
marriage by reason of a positive policy of the State for the protection of
235. Id. at 502.
236. See Recent Case, supra note 231, at 1374. The article also notes the "frailty"
of rights found in state constitutions and questions whether a firm basis for expanded
rights for lesbians and gay men can be found in Wasson. Id. at 1374-75.
237. The comments following Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 210 indicate
that approval of the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act was withdrawn because § 210 and §
207 (prohibiting certain marriages) are inconsistent with the Act. The comment suggests
that "[a] state adopting this Act should repeal the earlier one, if it exists therein." UNIF.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 210, 9A U.L.A. 177 (1987). See also infra part II.B.
238. See infra notes 253-60 and accompanying text.
239. 217 111. App. 571 (1920).
240. Id. at 575. For a discussion of this "natural law" exception, see Joseph W.
Hovermill, A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of Hawaii's
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 53 MD. L. REV. 450, 459-60, 482-85 (1994).
241. 100 N.E. 222 (111. 1912).
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the morals and the good order of society against serious social evils" are
void. 2 What is more difficult to determine is whether our couple's
marriage in Hawaii would fall within the general rule pointing to
validation, or the exception which allows public policy, however defined,
to prevent validity. This question will be clarified in the next sub-part
when considered under Illinois precedent interpreting its evasion statute.
States with validation statutes should be urged to follow their
statutory directives, as ordained by section 210 of the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act and section 6(1) of the Second Restatement, and validate
our couple's marriage.' Previous cases, if available, which have
validated marriages although contrary to state statutes, can be used to
bolster this argument. It is difficult, however, to ascertain whether any
specific court will validate our couple's marriage because of the likelihood
that it will consider policy concerns despite these statutory directives.
B. Same-Sex Marriage and Evasion Statutes
Four states adopted the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act during its
brief existence. Those states are Illinois, Massachusetts, Vermont, and
Wisconsin.' The typical language contained in these statutes can be
found in the Vermont statute:
If a person residing and intending to continue to reside in this
state is prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of
this state and such person goes into another state or country and
there contracts a marriage prohibited and declared void by the
laws of this state, such marriage shall be null and void for all
purposes in this state. 5
242. Lincoln, 217 Ill. App. at 575.
243. Robert A. Sedler also notes, in discussing interest analysis, that when the
forum's legislature has directed that a statute shall apply to a case containing a foreign
element, "the forum must apply the statute to that situation, totally apart from choice of
law considerations." Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the
Conflict of Laws: A Response to the "New Critics", 34 MERCER L. REv. 593, 610 (1983).
244. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 5/216 (Smith-Hurd 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 207, § 10 (West 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 5 (1993); WIS. STAT. §
765.04 (1993).
245. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 5 (1993). This language corresponds with § 1 of
the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act. Section 6 prevents couples from going to Vermont
to marry if the marriage would be void in their own domicile. This section does not relate
to our couple because Hawaii, the probable location of our couple's same-sex marriage,
has not adopted that section and residents of Hawaii would not go to Vermont to obtain
a same-sex marriage. Section 6 states:
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When applying this type of evasion statute to our couple married in
Hawaii, a few questions emerge. It would seem, on the face of the
statute, that the Hawaii marriage might well be declared null in these
jurisdictions. First, our couple did reside in the state and they intend to
continue residing in the state. Second, they went to another state and
contracted a marriage. What is questionable, however, is whether our
couple contracted a marriage that was prohibited by their home state.
Unlike cases involving incest, polygamy, under-age marriage, or
premature marriage following divorce, very few state statutes have
declared same-sex marriages to be "prohibited and declared void."
Because the marriage statutes of these states do not restrict marriage to
opposite-sex couples, same-sex marriages are arguably not prohibited
within the meaning of the evasion statutes.
Precedent is helpful in defining the parameters concerning which
marriages would be "prohibited and declared void by the laws of this
state." The Vermont case of Wheelock v. Wheelocke explores the
meaning of this language. In that case, the woman was divorced in May,
1917; she then married her new husband in New York City in June,
1918. Both knew that they could not be legally married in Vermont
because a Vermont statute prohibited a divorced person from marrying
someone, besides the person she divorced, for three years after the
divorce. 7 Despite that statute, which had been held to apply to in-state
marriages, the Vermont courts had considered out-of-state marriages,
prior to enactment of the marriage evasion statute, to be valid because the
statute had no extra-territorial force. The courts followed the general rule
that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere.'
The Wheelock court noted two exceptions to this general rule which
it found to be well-recognized: marriages contrary to the law of nature as
generally recognized by Christian civilized states, and marriages which
the state's lawmakers had declared invalid on public policy grounds. 9
The court discussed only the second exception. Presumably, it could be
argued that the first exception would apply to same-sex marriage although
A marriage shall not be contracted in this state by a person residing and
intending to continue to reside in another state orjurisdiction, if such marriage
would be void if contracted in such other state or jurisdiction. Every
marriage solemnized in this state in violation of this section shall be null and
void.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 6 (1993).
246. 154 A. 665 (Vt. 1931).
247. General Law of March 16, 1925, § 3602 (current version at VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 560 (1993)).
248. 154 A. at 665-66.
249. Id. at 666.
1994:1033 1075
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
historically that exception has only been applied to polygamous marriages
and incestuous marriages of close consanguinity.' ° In determining
whether the second exception applied in the Wheelock case, the court
noted that, although the state clearly had the power to prohibit marriages
as against established public policy, in order to render the out-of-state
marriage void under the evasion statute, there must be "an express
statutory provision to that effect."2' In that case, a statute did prohibit
re-marriage within three years; thus, an express statutory provision
applied and the marriage was declared invalid. 2
This same requirement that an express statutory prohibition is needed
to invalidate the marriage is also found in other evasion statute states.
For example, in Schwartz v. Schwartz," an Illinois court considered a
case involving two young people who, although domiciled in Chicago,
were married in Indiana. Under the Illinois statute, they were competent
to contract a legal marriage with their parents' consent.' Because the
statute did not declare a marriage to be void if performed without
consent, the court held that the evasion statute did not apply. 5 The
court focused on the language of the evasion statute which required that
the marriage be "prohibited and declared void by the laws of this state"
in order to be "null and void,"' and held that no statute "prohibits and
declares void" the marriage contracted by the parties in that case. 7
The court referred to the case of Reifschneider v. Reifschneider,"
which explained the difference between statutes which declared a nullity
and those which were directory only.
The general rule is, that unless the statute expressly declares a
marriage contracted without the necessary consent of the
parents, or other requirements of the statute, to be a nullity,
such statutes will be construed to be directory, only, in this
250. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 13.5, at 436 (2d
ed. 1992); see also G.W. Bartholomew, Recognition of Polygamous Marriages in
America, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1022 (1964); Hovermill, supra note 240; Frederic P.
Storke, The Incestuous Marriage-Relic of the Past, 36 U. COLO. L. REV. 473 (1964).
251. Wheelock, 154 A. at 666; see also Johnson, supra note 183, at 454 (noting
that evasion statutes are not as broad as originally believed because "they apply only to
marriages 'declared void' by the domicil").
252. Wheelock, 154 A. at 666.
253. 236 111. App. 336 (1925).
254. CAHILL'S STAT. ch 89, § 3 (1921) (repealed 1977).
255. 236 11.. App. at 337.
256. CAHILL'S STAT. ch. 89, § 20 (repealed 1977) (current § 1 of the Uniform
Marriage Evasion Act of 1915).
257. 236 I11. App. at 337.
258. 89 N.E. 255 (111. 1909).
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respect, so that the marriage will be held valid although the
disobedience of the statute may entail penalties on the licensing
or officiating authorities. 9
The Schwartz court noted that, although the Retfschneider case was
decided before the evasion statute was enacted, nothing in the evasion
statute changed this general rule.' °
Couples living in these four marriage evasion statute states who
intend to travel to Hawaii to enter a same-sex marriage may find their
marriages subject to challenge under the evasion statutes. Since none of
these states expressly prohibit same-sex marriage, however, it is likely
that their courts would be bound to follow earlier precedent requiring an
express prohibition in the positive law of the state before the evasion
statute's language would become relevant. If that is the case, same-sex
marriage should be upheld as valid.
This same analysis would seem to apply to those states which have
adopted evasion statutes other than the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act's
version. For example, Arizona combines the statute on validity with one
on evasion:
Marriages contracted in other state; validity and effect
A. Marriages valid by the laws of the place where
contracted are valid in this state.
B. Marriages solemnized in another state or country by
parties intending at the time to reside in this state shall
have the same legal consequences and effect as if
solemnized in this state.
C. Parties residing in this state may not evade the laws of
this state relating to marriage by going to another state
or country for solemnization of the marriage."
259. Id. at 257.
260. 236 111. App. at 338; see also Acklin v. Employees' Benefit Ass'n of
American Steel Foundries, 222 Ill. App. 369 (1922) (considering legality of marriage
performed in foreign state to be determined by laws of state in which the marriage was
performed unless marriage is in violation of some positive law of the state). It should be
noted, however, that because a marriage violating a state's age requirements is not one
which would be "abhorent" to state policy, these cases might be valid although
"abhorent" marriages might not be. Charles W. Taintor, I, Effect of Extra-State
Marriage Ceremonies, 10 Miss. L.J. 105, 129 (1938). Marriages considered "abhorent"
would have included miscegenous marriages and remarriage with a paramour. Id. at 129
& n.121.
261. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-112 (1991).
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Numerous other states also have evasion statutes. 2 But none of the
262. Those statutes indicate the following restrictions: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 104 (1992) ("If a marriage prohibited by this chapter is contracted or solemnized outside
of the State, when the legal residence of either party to the marriage is in this State, and
the parties thereto shall afterwards live and cohabit as husband and wife within the State,
they shall be punished in the same manner as though the marriage had been contracted in
this State."); D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-105 (1981) ("If any marriage declared illegal by the
foregoing sections shall be entered into in another jurisdiction by persons having and
retaining their domicile in the District of Columbia, such marriage shall be deemed
illegal, and may be decreed to be void in said District in the same manner as if it had
been celebrated therein."); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-43 (1982) ("Parties residing in this
state may not evade any of the laws of this state as to marriage by going to another state
for the solemnization of the marriage ceremony."); IND. CODE § 31-7-6-6 (1993) ("A
marriage is void if the parties to the marriage: (1) are residents of Indiana; (2) had their
marriage solemnized in another state with intent to: (A) evade IC 31-7-3-3 [marriage
license requirements] or IC 31-7-3-10 [mental incompetency prohibition]; and (B)
subsequently return to Indiana and reside in Indiana; and (3) without having established
residence in another state in good faith, return to Indiana and reside in Indiana after the
marriage is solemnized."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 91 (West 1978) ("When
residents of this State, with intent to evade subchapter II [incest, mental incompetency and
polygamy prohibitions] and to return and reside here, go into another state or country and
there have their marriage solemnized and afterwards return and reside here, such marriage
is void in this State."); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 207, § 10 (1988) ("If any person residing and
intending to continue to reside in this commonwealth is disabled or prohibited from
contracting marriage under the laws of this commonwealth and goes into another
jurisdiction and there contracts a marriage prohibited and declared void by the laws of this
commonwealth, such marriage shall be null and void for all purposes .... "); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-1-3 (1993) ("Any attempt to evade section 93-1-1 [incest prohibitions)
by marrying out of this state and returning to it shall be within the prohibitions of said
section."); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-40 (Michie 1990) ("If any persons, resident in this
Commonwealth, and within the degrees of relationship mentioned in that section, [incest
and bigamy prohibitions] shall go out of this Commonwealth for the purpose of being
married, and with the intention of returning, and be married out of it .... they shall be
punished as provided in this section, and the marriage shall be governed by the same law
as if it had been solemnized in this Commonwealth."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 5
(1993) ("If a person residing and intending to continue to reside in this state is prohibited
from contracting marriage under the laws of this state and such person goes into another
state or country and there contracts a marriage prohibited and declared void by the laws
of this state, such marriage shall be null and void for all purposes in this state."); W. VA.
CODE § 48-1-17 (1992) ("If any person resident of this State shall, in order to evade the
law, and with an intention of returning to reside in this State, go into another state or
country, and there intermarry in violation of section one (§ 48-2-1), article two of this
chapter [divorce definitions], and shall afterwards return and reside here, such marriage
shall be governed by the same law, in all respects, as if it had been solemnized in this
State.").
None of these statutes explicitly prohibit same-sex marriage and thus, arguably, by
the terms of the statutes, they would not prohibit our couple from going to Hawaii, getting
married, and returning to these states.
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references to prohibited marriages contained in those statutes consider
same-sex marriages to fall within the bounds of the evasion statutes.'
Cases interpreting the Arizona statute conform to the above analysis.
In Horton v. Horton,' the court considered the validity of a marriage
contracted in New Mexico within the one-year time period when
remarriage was not permitted in Arizona, and noted that the remarriage
statutes did not declare such a marriage to be void, but "merely in general
terms prohibit[ed] such a marriage. No penalty is affixed for
disobedience."' The court referred to the "overwhelming weight of
the better reasoned cases" which held that a marriage, even if prohibited
by statute, is valid if celebrated elsewhere, even when the parties marry
in that place to evade local laws "unless the Legislature has clearly
enacted that such marriages out of the state shall have no validity
here."' The court believed that the reasoning behind such validation
could be traced back to Justice Story's treatise on Conflicts:
All civilized nations allow marriage contracts. They are juris
gentium, and the subjects of all nations are equally concerned
in them. Infinite mischief and confusion must necessarily arise
to the subjects of all nations with respect to legitimacy,
succession, and other rights, if the respective laws of different
countries were only to be observed as to marriages contracted
by subjects of those countries abroad; and therefore all nations
have consented, or are presumed to consent, for the common
benefit and advantage, that such marriages shall be good or not
according to the laws of the country where they are celebrated.
By observing this rule few, if any, inconveniences can arise.
By disregarding it, infinite mischiefs must ensue.2'
263. But see IND. CODE ANN. § 31-7-1-2 (West 1984) and VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
45.2 (Michie 1990) (prohibiting same-sex marriage). While these statutes prohibit same-
sex marriage within Indiana and Virginia, neither state's evasion statute considers same-
sex marriages to violate the evasion statute. See also Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal
Corp., 4 S.E.2d 364 (Va. 1939) and Hager v. Hager, 349 S.E.2d 908 (Va. Ct. App.
1986) (declaring those bigamous marriages void ab initio).
264. 198 P. 1105 (1921).
265. Id. at 1106.
266. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458 (1873)).
267. Horton, 198 P. at 1107 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121 (7th ed. 1872)). But see Engdahl, supra note 168, at 99-103
(challenging Story's assertion of universal status for marriage).
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The court determined that because the legislature did not prohibit
remarriages out-of-state within the time period, the evasion statute did not
apply.2
When, however, the Arizona legislature had expressly declared a
marriage void, the court invalidated the marriage under the evasion
statute. In In re Mortenson, the court considered a marriage in New
Mexico between two Arizona residents who were first cousins and who
returned to their domicile in Arizona following the ceremony. New
Mexico law did not prohibit marriage between first cousins but an
Arizona statute did.' Invalidating the New Mexico marriage, the court
held that, due to the "clear intention on the part of the legislature to
establish a strong public policy," the marriages were void within
Arizona.27' The court noted: "A marriage declared void by our statute
cannot be purified or made valid by merely stepping across the state line
for purpose of solemnization. We cannot permit the public policy of this
state to be defeated by such tactics." 2" Therefore, one can expect that
only those marriages which are expressly declared void or prohibited by
statute will be invalid within a state having a combination of an evasion
statute and a statute validating out-of-state marriages.
Because most marriage statutes are silent about same-sex marriage,
it could be possible, but potentially dangerous, to argue that a court
should consider other expressions of state public policy, as well as prior
choice-of-law decisions, when deciding whether the out-of-state marriage
violates public policy. Advocates must resolve this tactical question of
whether to pursue this course depending on whether expressions of state
policy could be viewed as positive or negative. They should be prepared,
however, to expect the other side to raise those expressions of public
policy on the issue that could be viewed negatively.
For example, in Wisconsin, such a review of other statutes might
yield positive results for our couple. In 1982, Wisconsin became the first
state to adopt a statute prohibiting discrimination against lesbians and gay
men on the basis of sexual orientation, and since has developed a
comprehensive statutory scheme prohibiting discrimination.'
268. Horton, 198 P. at 1107.
269. 316 P.2d 1106 (Ariz. 1957).
270. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (1991).
271. Mortenson, 316 P.2d at 1107.
272. Id.
273. The Wisconsin legislature has not simply evinced a passive attitude toward
sexual minorities living in Wisconsin. It has taken significant steps to prevent harmful
differences in treatment. Each statute prohibits some form of differential treatment due
to sexual orientation. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 943.01(3) (West 1993) (felony to damage
community property based on sexual orientation); id. § 939.645(1)(b) (increased penalties
1080
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Additionally, Wisconsin has adopted a consenting adults statute which
ended state regulation of sexual activity between consenting adults in
private.274 These statutory provisions indicating respect for lesbian and
gay lifestyles and prohibiting discrimination could be used to argue that
Wisconsin's public policy would support the notion of same-sex marriage,
and that given the marriage statutes' silence and lack of an express
prohibition, out-of-state same-sex marriages should not be voided by the
marriage evasion statute. 75  Finding similar expressions of policies
for crimes against victims based on sexual orientation); id. § 440.77(1)(o) (prohibits
discrimination in loan practices); id. § 234.29 (prohibits discrimination in housing
projects); id. § 230.18 (prohibits discrimination in civil service); id. § 230.01(2) (prohibits
discrimination in state employment); id. § 227.10(3)(a) (prohibits discrimination in state
administrative rules); id. § 146.025(7)(c)l (HIV test results may not indicate patient's
sexual orientation); id. § 111.85(2)(b) (prohibits discrimination in fair share agreements);
id. § 111.81(12)(b) (prohibits discrimination in state employee labor organizations); id.
§ 111.70(2) (prohibits discrimination in municipal fair share agreements); id. § 111.321
(prohibits employment discrimination); id. § 111.32(13)(m) ("sexual orientation" defined
as having, having a history of, or being identified with, a preference for heterosexuality,
homosexuality, or bisexuality); id. § 111.31(1) (employment discrimination substantially
and adversely affects state's general welfare); id. § 101.22(1) (prohibits housing
discrimination); id. § 66.433(3) (community commissions recommend solutions to sexual
orientation discrimination in housing, employment, and public accommodations and
facilities); id. § 66.432(1) (equal opportunity in housing is local concern); id. §§
66.431(3)(e)2, 66.43(2m) (entitlement to slum clearance benefits without regard to sexual
orientation); id. § 66.405(2m) (equal opportunity in urban redevelopment projects); id.
§ 66.40(2m) (prohibits discrimination by housing authorities); id. § 66.395(2m) (prohibits
discrimination in elderly housing); id. § 66.39(13) (prohibits discrimination in veterans
housing); id. § 38.23(1) (prohibits discrimination against vocational, technical, and adult
education students); id. § 36.12(1) (prohibits discrimination against University of
Wisconsin System students); id. § 21.35 (prohibits discrimination in Wisconsin National
Guard admission); id. § 16.765(1) (prohibits discrimination by state contractors); id. §
15.04(1)(g) (state agency heads must take remedial action to end discrimination).
These statutes clearly indicate that sexual minorities may not be treated differently
due to their sexual orientation.
274. The legislature, by ending its regulation of private sexual activity between
consenting adults, indicated an acceptance of relationships outside the marital relationship
although it did not expressly condone them. Id. § 944.01. By revising §§ 944.15 and
944.17 so that they no longer criminalize certain gay and lesbian sexual activity, the
legislature indicated a willingness to allow individuals to choose the intimate relationships
that best express their personalities, desires, and beliefs.
275. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not been as receptive to
recognizing the rights of gay men and lesbians. For example, in In re Z.J.H., 162 Wis.
2d 1002, 471 N.W.2d 202 (1991), the court held that a lesbian co-parent was not eligible
to obtain custody or visitation of her ex-partner's biological child. Accord Nancy S. v.
Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d
27 (N.Y. 1991). The court is currently considering a case which could overrule this
decision, Holtzman v. Knott, 520 N.W.2d 91 (Wis. 1994) (granting petition to bypass
court of appeals). However, that seems unlikely given its recent decision in In re Angel
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positive toward lesbians and gay men in other states would make it
possible to assert the same argument in those states.2V6
However, by expanding the search for public policy statements
beyond the marriage statutes, it becomes equally possible for opponents
to turn to sodomy statutes2" or adoption statutes278 which indicate an
unwillingness to accept a lesbian or gay lifestyle. If a court were to
consider all expressions of public policy by the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of the state, it might hold that the out-of-state same-sex
marriage should be voided. Statutory interpretation in this area is
amorphous and searching for clear meaning is difficult. The best our
couple can hope for is a solid understanding of the factors the courts will
consider and a set of strong arguments in support of validating their same-
sex marriage from Hawaii.
Lace M., 184 Wis. 2d 492, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994). In that case, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court rejected a lesbian couple's petition which requested the court to allow the
co-parent to adopt her partner's biological child, while allowing the biological mother to
retain parental rights.
276. Among the states where these arguments may be persuasive would be those
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. In addition to Wisconsin, those
states include California, Hawaii, Minnesota, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey and the District of Columbia. Advocates in Massachusetts and Minnesota,
however, may encounter opposing arguments based on the public policy expressed in their
sodomy statutes. Gross, supra note 17, at C12. Additionally, other state courts which
have expressed state policies favorable to gay men and lesbians include: In re Petition of
L.S. and V.L., Nos. A-269-90, A-270-90, 1991 WL 219598 (D.C. Super. Aug. 30, 1991)
(allowing adoption by lesbian couple of each other's biological child); In re Kowalski, 478
N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (granting guardianship of severely disabled woman
to her lesbian life partner despite her family's objection); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543
N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (including same-sex couples within family definition of rent
control statute); In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (allowing adoption of
child by same-sex partner of child's biological mother); In re R.C., No. 9088 (Vt. P. Ct.
Dec. 9, 1991) (allowing adoption in similar case). This limited listing of supportive
statutes and cases is intended to serve as an example of the numerous options advocates
have for finding positive expressions of state public policy toward same-sex couples.
277. Gross, supra note 17, at B12; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986).
278. Florida and New Hampshire expressly prohibit adoptions by gay men and
lesbians. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-
B:4 (1990). Additionally, many states deny child custody to gay or lesbian parents upon
divorce. See, e.g., S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
that mother's lesbianism causes unhealthy environment for children). But see S.N.E. v.
R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985) (holding reliance on possible stigma due to mother's
lesbianism to be an impermissible reason to change custody to father); Bottoms v.
Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (overruling trial court's decision to take
custody from natural parent, holding that mother's lesbianism did not make her an unfit
parent).
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C. Same-Sex Marriage in Statutorily Unguided Situations
In addition to the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws which
continues to be used by fifteen states,2' the remaining thirty-five states
and the District of Columbia use some alternative choice-of-law approach;
chief among them are Brainerd Currie's "governmental interest
analysis,"280  the Second Restatement's "most significant
relationship"2"' test and Robert A. Leflar's "choice-influencing
considerations."2" This sub-part now reviews these approaches for
resolving choice-of-law disputes and considers how to use each when
advocating for recognition of an out-of-state same-sex marriage. This
sub-part also attempts to categorize each state under one of the
approaches"s so that advocates will be able to use arguments consistent
with a state's choice-of-law approach when arguing for recognition of
same-sex marriage.'2
279. Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 357 (1992). Those states are Alabama, Georgia, Kansas,
Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming. Id. at 373 n. 112.
280. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 90
(1963).
281. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 169, § 6.
282. Leflar, supra note 175. Additional theories that courts use, to a minor extent,
include the center of gravity test, which chooses the law of the state with the greatest
number of contacts with the case; David Caver's "principles of preference" system, which
considers governmental interests and party expectations; Chief Judge Fuld's rules from
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972), which also focus on those interests
and expectations; and "lex fori," which applies the law of the forum. Gregory E. Smith,
Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1046-48, 1049-50 (1987).
These methods of analysis are used sparingly and by few courts. Id. at 1047 n.24, 1049.
283. After analyzing the states' different approaches, Patrick Borchers was left
with three states (Kentucky, Michigan and New York) which were impossible to classify
under any given approach. Borchers stated that Kentucky and Michigan have exercised
"a blunt forum law preference" and he categorized them as having chosen the lexfori.
New York defied classification and used a combined approach which its court of appeals
classified as lex loci delicti and interest analysis. Borchers, supra note 279, at 374; see
also William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?,
34 MERCER L. REV. 645, 678-84, 698-702 (1983).
284. This attempt to categorize is difficult. Examining all choice-of-law marriage
cases for every state is beyond the scope of this Article. But see Barbara J. Cox, Same-
Sex Marriage and State-by-State Categorization of Choice-of-Law Approach (forthcoming).
For this Article, I have primarily used three sources for categorization. Borchers, supra
note 279; Smith, supra note 282, and Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of
Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 521 (1983). Those articles focus primarily on
torts and contracts cases. There are disagreements between the authors as to which
particular states follow which approach. Many of those disagreements stem from either
the time lag between each survey's compilation, the difference between focusing on a
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1. THE FIRST RESTATEMENT
Even the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws would not always lead
a state court to validate an out-of-state same-sex marriage.21 This is
true despite the fact that the First Restatement is characterized by fixed,
mechanical, and thus predictable, rules. 2  The First Restatement is
based on the multi-lateralist theory of choice-of-law, which attempts to
solve conflicts problems by establishing choice-of-law norms that are
external to the forum's substantive law. 2 7  These rules select which
state's laws govern the case without considering the substantive content
of the rules vying for use.288  As the First Restatement is grounded in
the "vested rights" theory, the Restatement's reporter, Joseph Beale,
explained that the forum court's role is not to apply foreign law, but
instead to enforce existing rights created under that foreign law.' The
First Restatement requires courts to apply the law of the geographical
place where the key event leading to the plaintiff's cause of action
occurred .2
specific subject matter (Borchers and torts) as opposed to conducting a more broad-based
survey (Smith and Kay), and questions about how to categorize a given state. See, e.g.,
Borchers, supra note 279, at 368 (noting 11 problematic jurisdictions). For additional
surveys, see P. John Kozyris & Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 1989.: An Overview, 38 AM. J. CoMP. L. 601 (1990); Michael E. Solimine, An
Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REV. 49 (1989).
As Borchers notes, surveys become obsolete quickly given the pace with which
states change or modify their approaches. Using Professor Kay's surveys as an example,
Borchers notes that Kay reported 22 states as following the First Restatement in Kay's
1983 survey. Borchers further observes that only 16 states followed the First Restatement
in Kay's 1989 survey. Borchers, supra note 279, at 367 n.87. Because Borchers' work
was completed in 1992 and thus is the most up-to-date work on this issue, this Article uses
Borcher's categorizations, while attempting to note any conflicts with Kay or Smith.
While recognizing that each state will have an already-developed choice-of-law
approach, this Article continues in Part II.A to encourage the use of one of Leflar's
choice-influencing considerations, "the better rule of law," which should lead to
recognition of same-sex marriage. Advocates in states which do not use Leflar's approach
could, instead, frame their arguments to contend that recognizing same-sex marriage is
the "better" public policy result, given many of the reasons explained infra part Ill.
285. RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter FIRST
RESTATEMENT].
286. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 250, § 2.6, at 15.
287. Borchers, supra note 279, at 359.
288. Id. at 359; see also David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law
Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 194 (1933); Friedrich K. Juenger, General Course on
Private International Law, 193 RECUEIL DES COURS 119, 208 (1985).
289. Id. at 359-60.
290. Smith, supra note 282, at 1043.
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For marriage cases decided under section 121 of the First
Restatement, the rule of lex loci celebrationis would apply; in other
words, a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere."'
Although comment d to section 121 indicates that the law of the domicile
governs the domestic status of marriage, the differences between states'
marriage laws would "lead to great difficulty, if it were not for the fact
that all Anglo-American states agree in creating the status of marriage
(except in rare cases considered in sections 131 and 132) in every case
where there is a contract of marriage valid in the state where the contract
is made."' The courts are understandably reluctant "to negate a
relationship upon which so many personal and governmental
considerations depend."' In fact, denying a normal incident of
marriage to a validly married couple is a harsh measure that should be
avoided unless enjoyment of that incident "violently offends the moral
sense of the community."'
But it is possible, under the First Restatement, that our couple's
marriage in Hawaii could be found to offend a community's moral sense
and be treated as one of the "rare" cases under section 132. That section
states:
A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil
of either party, though the requirements of the law of the state
of celebration have been complied with, will be invalid
everywhere in the following cases:
(a) polygamous marriage,
(b) incestuous marriage between persons so closely related
that their marriage is contrary to a strong public
policy of the domicil,
(c) marriage between persons of different races where
such marriages are at the domicil regarded as odious,
291. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 285, § 121. For cases applying this rule,
see Fine, supra note 168, at 37 n. 11. But see C.W. Taintor, II, What Law Governs the
Ceremony, Incidents and Status of Marriage, 19 B.U. L. REV. 353, 368 (1939)
(questioning a focus on the law of the place of the ceremony because that state has no
interest in the intrinsic validity of the marital status).
292. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 285, § 121 cmt. d. Section 131 applies to
remarriage after divorce and § 132 applies to marriages void under domicile law. id.
293. Johnson, supra note 183, at 456.
294. Charles W. Taintor, II, Marriage in the Conflict of Laws, 9 VAND. L. REV.
607, 615 (1956).
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(d) marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the
domicil makes void even though celebrated in another
state. 9
5
Thus, although section 121 of the First Restatement would lead one to
expect that our couple, married in Hawaii, could return to their domicile
and find strong support for validation of their marriage, section 132
allows the domiciliary state to limit marital recognition. Although same-
sex marriages are not specifically included within section 132, comment
b indicates that the list is "not intended to be an exclusive enumeration
and if a marriage offends a strong policy of the domicil in any other
respect, such marriage will be invalid everywhere."' However, with
regard to miscegenous marriages (which were still restricted when the
First Restatement was published) comment c indicates that, in order to be
"odious" under section 132(c), they must "not only be prohibited by
statute but must offend a deep-rooted sense of morality predominant in the
state." 7  Thus, despite section 132, in states following the First
Restatement, our same-sex couple could have their marriage in Hawaii
validated if (1) the state chose to follow section 121 which would validate
it automatically or, (2) even if the state followed section 132, it did not
have a statute prohibiting same-sex marriage, or same-sex marriage was
not found to offend that state's "predominant" sense of morality.
When the First Restatement refers to offending public policy, it does
not simply mean that the state's law does not address the issue.
Recognizing this is important for our couple because most states do not
have statutes addressing same-sex marriage." The case of Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co.' is instructive. Although it was addressing the issue
of whether a right of action which arose under a Massachusetts wrongful
death statute could be enforced in New York, the court turned to the
question of whether the difference between New York and Massachusetts
law was a sufficient reason to decline jurisdiction over the case.
295. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 285, § 132.
296. Id. at cmt. b.
297. Id. at cmt. c. Although miscegenous marriages are now protected by Loving
v. Virginia, states which still follow the First Restatement could use comment c to
invalidate a same-sex marriage. See also Taintor, supra note 294, at 625 (concluding that
only when a state declares a marriage will be void does that state express "a strong
enough public policy to require the inference that it makes extra-state ceremonies
ineffective"). Taintor was describing the state of the law under the First Restatement
which was in effect almost universally at the time of that article. Thus, it may be that
only those First Restatement states which expressly prohibit same-sex marriage have
sufficiently declared that these marriages are odious within the meaning of § 132(c).
298. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
299. 120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 1918).
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Our own scheme of legislation may be different. We may
even have no legislation on the subject. That is not enough to
show that public policy forbids us to enforce the foreign right.
• . . We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a
problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at
home.'
Justice Cardozo continued by noting:
The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the
pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of
expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors, unless
help would violate some fundamental principle ofjustice, some
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition
of the common weal."
It is possible that our couple's same-sex marriage would be found to
violate that sense of morality.' Despite the fixed rule in favor of
validity, numerous older cases following the First Restatement did reject
out-of-state marriages as invalid, despite the fact that they were valid
where celebrated.' These results occurred because the Restatement's
rigid rules led judges to invoke a system of escape devices. "Because the
rules by and large ignore government interests, the policies behind legal
rules, the parties' expectations, and justice in the individual case, the
escape devices have been used to import those considerations into the
choice-of-law process."' Thus, even when choice-of-law decisions
tended to follow mechanical rules, courts maintained their prerogative to
300. Id. at 201.
301. Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
302. Additionally, § 134 of the First Restatement could be used by states that do
not want to recognize the same-sex marriages of couples who did not originally reside in
the state but who moved to that state after their marriage. Section 134 allows one state
to refuse to extend any particular incident of marriage to a couple if it finds it sufficiently
offensive to public policy to do so. See cases cited supra note 168.
303. See Taintor, supra note 260, Taintor, supra note 291, Taintor, supra note
294; Johnson, supra note 183.
304. RICHMAN Er AL., supra note 176, § 67, at 190. The escape devices were
dangerous because the judges employing them simply stated the technical rationales for
their use, rather than stating the concerns for policy and justice that motivated their use.
Id. "In other words, the escape device assures that the reasons for the court's decision
will have little to do with the reasons announced in the court's opinion. The result is that
the court has a freedom to indulge in unprincipled decision-making, a freedom
incompatible with the rule of law." Id. (footnote omitted).
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invalidate marriages when contrary to local public policy.' Because
section 132 allows an explicit "escape device" from section 121's rule
favoring validation, courts hesitant to recognize same-sex marriages may
attempt to invoke public policy grounds to refuse recognition. Advocates
in First Restatement states should pressure courts to be true to the narrow
exemption and only invalidate the marriage if it offends the state's "deep-
rooted sense of morality."'
Fifteen states still follow the First Restatement. Those states are
Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. ' Of those states, only
Maryland and Virginia specifically prohibit same-sex marriage.'"
Thus, only those two states fall into the situation expressed in section
132(c), characterizing same-sex marriage as "odious" by statutorially
prohibiting it." The rest of the First Restatement states, particularly
Georgia, Kansas, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming
(which all have marriage validation statutes), should be receptive to
arguments that our couple's marriage should be recognized because it
would not offend state public policy.""
305. Perhaps these escape devices are what saved the First Restatement from
extinction. Although some of its resilience comes from the dearth of recent court
decisions in some of those states, several jurisdictions have recently rejected modem
choice-of-law theories in favor of the more definite, predictable rules found in the First
Restatement. RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 176, § 67, at 190-91.
306. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 285, § 132 cmt. c.
307. Borchers, supra note 279, at 373. Both Kay and Smith also agree that these
states follow the First Restatement. Kay, supra note 284, at 591-92; Smith, supra note
282, at 1172-74.
308. See supra note 216.
309. Comment c indicates that not only must there be a statute prohibiting the
marriage, but that the marriage must also offend a "deep-rooted sense of morality
predominant in the state." It is thus possible that the same-sex marriage prohibitions do
not, by themselves, establish this "sense of morality" which would be offended. It could
be argued, however, that because each state also has a sodomy statute, those statutes,
taken together, express such a sense of morality. Since Maryland and Virginia's sodomy
statutes prohibit both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, it could be argued that those
statutes do not evince a particularized sense of morality against same-sex couples.
However, § 132 cmt. d indicates that sub-section (d) has the evasion statutes in mind
when it refers to statutes which the domicile enacts to void out-of-state marriages, and
declares that § 132(d) would void all marriages in these circumstances. Virginia has such
an evasion statute but it has a marriage validation statute as well. FIRST RESTATEMENT,
supra note 285, § 132 cmts. c, d. Additionally, at least one other commentator has
assumed that Virginia probably would not recognize a same-sex marriage. Kay, supra
note 284, at 589.
310. Note that Georgia, Tennessee, Vermont and West Virginia also have evasion
statutes. See supra part II.B. However, because none of those states prohibit same-sex
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Having considered how First Restatement states would analyze same-
sex marriage cases, it is now time to turn to other approaches used to
resolve choice-of-law cases and consider how our couple's marriage
would be analyzed under each. Growing dissatisfaction with the First
Restatement's rigidity led to a "revolution" in American conflicts
law,3 ' which is still proceeding today. But that revolution also left
choice-of-law theory in a state of considerable disarray which has existed
for some time." 2
When the vested rights theory crumbled under sustained
assault in the late 1950s, observers of the conflicts scene
predicted confidently that a new theory (or possibly two) would
emerge dominant from scholarly and judicial activity. That
hope has proven forlorn. Instead, current choice-of-law theory
is marked by eclecticism and even eccentricity. No consensus
exists among scholars as to whether rules are desirable, whether
the choice-of-law process should evaluate the substantive content
of a rule, or whether courts can consider the merits of
competing state policies . . . . The disarray in the courts may
be worse. Four or five theories are in vogue among the various
states, with many decisions using-openly or covertly-more
than one theory. . . . Robert Leflar, the dean of conflicts
scholars, refers, not critically, to such decisions as employing
a "mish-mash."" 3
This Part next considers those major theories. But none of them
provide much certainty for our couple, returning from Hawaii, determined
to live as a married couple, when confronting the institutions in their
home state.
2. GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST ANALYSIS
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Brainerd Currie developed his
"governmental interest analysis" theory in a series of law review
articles." 4 Currie argued that the positive law and common-law rules
of a state express state policy choices which that state has an "interest"
marriage, it seems that those evasion statutes similarly would not extend to cover same-
sex marriages contracted outside the domicile.
311. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 250, § 2.6, at 15.
312. RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 176, § 82, at 241.
313. Id. § 82, at 241-42 (citation omitted).
314. These articles are collected in CURRIE, supra note 280.
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in applying to the state's domiciliaries.315 Currie's theory attempted to
ensure that the law applied in a particular context is the one "whose
application in a particular context will serve the purposes for which that
law was created."" 6 Currie divided the conflicts world into three
portions: false conflicts, true conflicts, and unprovided-for cases. 1
False conflicts occur when the parties have a common domicile; that state
has the only interest in applying its law, so the forum should apply the
law of the common domicile."' True conflicts arise when more than
one state has an interest in applying its law to a party. Unprovided-for
cases occur when no domiciliary benefits from application of his or her
state's law. 19 In the latter two cases, Currie suggested applying the
forum law; since the problem is insoluble, there is no good reason to
displace that jurisdiction's law."2 Interest analysts note that courts,
regardless of their purported approach or method, generally end up
applying their own law, as Currie advocated they should. 2
Currie would probably find that our couple's situation involves a
"false" conflict because, although they were married under one state's
law, that state was not their domicile. Instead, their domicile's law
315. Borchers, supra note 279, at 360-61.
316. Smith, supra note 282, at 1047.
317. Borchers, supra note 279, at 361.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. But see Larry Kramer, The Myth of the "Unprovided-For" Case, 75 VA.
L. REv. 1045 (1989); Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum
Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1305-09 (1989) (questioning Currie's presumption in
favor of forum law in true conflict cases). Currie did recognize that forum law might not
always be appropriate and argued for a "'more moderate and restrained interpretation
both of the policy and of the circumstances in which it must be applied to effectuate the
forum's legitimate purpose'".in an attempt to avoid the conflict. Kay, supra note 284,
at 540. Sedler points out that there are "relatively few cases" in which a court has to
make a choice-of-law decision because there are very few cases that are actually connected
with more than one state, the laws of which differ. Sedler, supra note 243, at 597.
321. Sedler, supra note 243, at 595.
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should control.' But, as can be seen from the statutory review above,
the domicile's law may be quite difficult to ascertain. 32
Many other commentators who encourage the use of interest analysis
would applaud "a benign revolution" in marriage cases in choice-of-law
situations.' These commentators believe that choice-of-law should
reject the notion that a marriage valid where celebrated is "universally"
valid and should instead determine whether the "status" of marriage exists
by considering the particular "incident" of marriage that is in controversy
322. Leflar has argued, however, that "false conflict" is a misnomer. He would
consider a "true conflict" to occur whenever any two states' laws could be applied; he
uses the term "false conflicts" to refer to false conflicts of governmental interests, not
false conflicts of laws. James A. White, Comment, Stacking the Deck: Wisconsin's
Application of Leflar's Choice-Influencing Considerations to Torts Choice-of-Law Cases,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 401, 407 n.35 (citing Robert A. Leflar, The Torts Provisions of the
Restatement (Second), 72 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 274-75 (1972); Robert A. Leflar, True
"False Conflicts" et Alia, 48 B.U. L. REV. 164, 169 (1968)).
Also consider Professor Brilmayer's example of the "activist" state legislature that
passes various consumer protection laws that it believes should be applied to every case
because its purpose is to protect all consumers, not just those who are residents of that
state. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICr OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECrIONS
§ 2.3, at 72 (1991). Brilmayer believes that Currie would respond that the state only has
an "interest" if the consumer is a resident of the state. Be that as it may, it would be
hard to argue that the state's "policy" is not to protect all consumers. Currie would
probably believe that Hawaii was overgrasping by trying to apply its marriage law outside
of Hawaii and, as Brilmayer notes, should "mind its own business." Id.; see also Larry
Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 294-95 (1990). But the
Baehr court's analysis recognizing unconstitutional sex discrimination and attempting to
end it would seem to establish Hawaii's "interest" in whether same-sex marriages
occurring in Hawaii are recognized by other states. It could also be possible that Hawaii
might consider itself to have an "interest" in attracting same-sex couples to the state for
marriage purposes, which would result in obvious tourism benefits. Courts using interest
analysis have considered "interests" such as these in other cases. See Susan Frelich
Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the Conflict of Laws, 1990 WiS. L. REV. 399,426
n. 105; see also Reese, supra note 23, at 962 (explaining that some marriage cases would
have reached "unfortunate results" if reliance on the state law of the common domicile
were required). Reese was considering the cases of In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4
(N.Y. 1953) (upholding the validity of a 32-year Rhode Island marriage by New York
domiciliaries who were uncle and niece) and In re Ommang's Estate, 235 N.W. 529
(Minn. 1931) (upholding the validity of a Minnesota marriage by Wisconsin domiciliaries
who could not marry in Wisconsin because the woman had been recently divorced).
323. Sedler does note that courts' primary concern in choice-of-law situations is
achieving a "functionally sound and fair result" in the case before it. Sedler, supra note
242, at 603. If this is true, then advocates should focus their arguments on why
recognizing same-sex marriage is sound and fair. Sedler may disagree with this
characterization of what is sound and fair, instead arguing that what is sound and fair is
to apply the forum's law to recognize that state's substantive law and policies. Id. at 636.
324. See supra note 168 (discussion of Engdahl).
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and decide whether providing the incident to the couple in that situation
would further the policy behind the statute or rule of law at issue.' z
Regardless of whether it would usually be helpful to consider only
the particular issue involved in the case, this methodology seems
problematic for our couple's same-sex marriage. Unlike most, our
couple's marital status will be questioned each and every time it. is
asserted. Litigating each incident of marriage, issue by issue, may, in
some circumstances, achieve a positive result. As with miscegenous
marriages, some policies behind granting incidents may not be offended
by recognizing the same-sex marriage.32 But for most same-sex
couples, practicality will require that they try to determine their "marital
status" universally, or they will be subject to relitigation every time they
assert it. In fact, they may choose to institute a declaratory judgment
action immediately upon returning to the domicile to clarify their marital
status.327 Because interest analysts would consider our couple to have
325. Engdahl, supra note 168, at 108-10; see also Baade, supra note 168, at 357.
Interest analysts are not the only ones suggesting such a denial of the universality
doctrine. Willis Reese, Reporter for the Second Restatement, makes a similar argument.
Reese, supra note 23, at 952. He believed that, except for the few situations where
validity is the only issue in the case, the particular issue involved should be considered
in making the choice of law in a manner consistent with other areas of choice-of-law. Id.
at 965; see also Taintor, supra note 291, at 368. In fact, Baade comments that the
Second Restatement's abandonment of the lex loci celebrationis and its adoption of the
issue-by-issue approach were major doctrinal milestones. Baade, supra note 168, at 379.
But see Fine, supra note 168, at 32-33 (arguing that the Second Restatement primarily
considers whether a couple is "married" in a universal sense, rather than considering
validity in relation to each particular incident). Comment a to § 283 of the Second
Restatement indicates that § 283 is concerned with what law governs a marriage's validity
as such, "without regard to any incident involving the marriage." SECOND
RESTATEMENT, supra note 169, § 284 cmt. a. It also indicates that courts tend to act on
the assumption that a decision concerning the validity of the marriage should precede a
determination of the incidents of the marriage. Id. Section 284 of the Second
Restatement considers when to allow an incident of marriage from an out-of-state couple's
marriage and concludes that a state will give the same incidents to such a marriage that
it gives to a valid locally contracted marriage. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 169,
§ 284 cmt. b. An exception is allowed in subsection (c) which would allow a state to
withhold recognition of an incident to an out-of-state marriage if to do so would violate
the strong public policy of the state, even though the marriage was valid where celebrated.
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 169, § 284 cmt. c. Just because the marriage would
have been invalid if contracted in the state is not sufficient to warrant denial of the
incident; the court should first find a strong public policy requiring denial. Id.
326. Engdahl, supra note 168, at 105-06; see also Inhabitants of Medway v.
Inhabitants of Needham, 16 Mass. 157 (1819) (marriage valid for purposes of support);
State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242 (1877) (marriage valid for fornication purposes).
327. See Reese, supra note 23, at 953.
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raised a false conflict, they would turn to the domicile's law to determine
their marriage's validity.
Borchers found that California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and New
Jersey have adopted interest analysis as their choice-of-law approach.'
Advocates in those states should expect to have the case characterized as
a false conflict and the domicile's law used. Hawaii has a validation
statute which, under this analysis, obviously does not present a
problem.32 Massachusetts also has an evasion statute, which might lead
the court to invalidate the marriage unless it is persuaded that because
Massachussetts has not prohibited same-sex marriages, the evasion statute
does not apply. New Jersey may follow the precedent of Wilkins v.
Zelichowski, which refused to recognize an out-of-state marriage by two
underage domiciliaries of New Jersey because New Jersey was the only
state with an interest in the marriage.3' The court concluded that the
couple had attempted to evade its public policy, as expressed by its
marriage statutes, and there was "no just or compelling reason" to let that
evasion attempt succeed.33
An argument could be made that California law would support the
same-sex marriage given its validation statute and its prohibition of
discrimination in employment and public accommodations. 32
328. Borchers notes that Hawaii and Massachusetts are problematic jurisdictions.
Borchers, supra note 279, at 373 n. 114. Kay found that only California and New Jersey
adopted interest analysis' theoretical basis, Kay, supra note 284, at 544, while noting that
other commentators included additional states in the interest analysis camp. Id. at 542-44.
Smith included the District of Columbia for tort cases, Louisiana for tort and contract
cases, New York for contract cases, and Oregon for tort and contract cases. Smith, supra
note 281, at 1172-73.
329. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-3, amended by Act of June 22, 1994, No. 217, §
4, 1994 Haw. Laws. As part of newly passed Act 217, the Hawaii legislature amended
§ 572-3 to read: "Marriages between a man and a woman legal in the country where
contracted shall be held legal in the courts of this State." Id. This new language may be
relevant if same-sex marriages are not first recognized in Hawaii and if a Hawaii resident
goes to another state to be married.
330. 140 A.2d 65, 67-68 (N.J. 1958).
331. Id. at 68. It may be possible to distinguish Wilkins because the case involved
a wife's request for annulment. Reese, supra note 23, at 960. Thus, New Jersey had a
reason to sever the union which was invalid under New Jersey law, and doing so did not
disappoint the expectations of one of the parties. Id. at 963. A counter-argument could
be made in the case of our couple, who are seeking recognition, not annulment, based on
the policy of protecting their expectations, which is a principal value behind universal
validation. Id. at 960.
332. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West Supp. 1994) prohibits discrimination in
employment due to sexual orientation. Although not explicitly protected by the Unruh
Civil Rights Act, cases interpreting that Act have extended its protections to gay men and
lesbians. See Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1984) (prohibiting
business establishments from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); Hubart v.
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Additionally, California has rejected Currie's view that the forum should
apply its own law in all true conflict cases.33 If California were to
consider this a true conflict, then it would merge its interest analysis
approach with a "comparative impairment" analysis," and might be
persuaded to consider whether Hawaii's interest would be more impaired
than California's by refusing to recognize our couple's marriage.
3. THE SECOND RESTATEMENT
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, reported by Professor
Willis Reese, was completed in 1971.115 According to Reese, the
Restatement's goal was to state narrow, precise, and definite rules in
areas such as status, corporations, and property, where some consensus
about which factors to consider existed among courts, while retaining
broad, flexible rules in areas such as contracts and torts which would lead
courts to sound results.3' Reese noted that the Second Restatement is
"eclectic" in nature, and places an emphasis upon territory, including the
state "where a person is domiciled or a resident."337 Although opposed
by numerous scholars,3" the American Law Institute adopted Reese's
theory to resolve conflicts cases. A court may exercise a "mild"
presumption in favor of forum law, but that presumption can be overcome
Williams, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1982) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in housing). Additionally, California no longer criminalizes oral or anal
sex between consenting adults. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 286, 288a (West 1993) (stating
sodomy and oral copulation statutes do not apply to consenting adults).
333. Kay, supra note 284, at 549.
334. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1963). Baxter argued that in true conflict cases the forum should determine
which state's policies would be most impaired if its law were not applied. BRILMAYER,
supra note 322, § 2.1, at 63. The California Supreme Court used this approach in
Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978) and Bernhard v.
Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976). Kay criticized
this step away from "true" interest analysis in Herma H. Kay, The Use of Comparative
Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68
CAL. L. REV. 577 (1980) and Kay, supra note 284, at 552. Missouri, which follows the
Second Restatement, also considered "comparative impairment" in Hicks v. Graves Truck
Lines, 707 S.W.2d 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); see Appleton, supra note 322, at 435-36.
335. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 169.
336. Kay, supra note 284, at 552-53 (citing Willis L.M. Reese, Conflicts of Laws
and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 679 (1963)).
337. Willis L.M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revised, 34
MERCER L. REV. 501, 508 (1983).
338. Those included Currie, Albert Ehrenzweig and others. Borchers, supra note
279, at 362.
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by applying multiple factors. 39 Section 6 of the Second Restatement
requires a court to apply the law of the state with the "most significant
relationship" to the parties and issue involved in the case, upon
considering the general principles collected in that section.' Thus,
state policies, considerations central to governmental interest analysis, and
other policies were joined with black letter choice-of-law rules."l
When considering the validity of out-of-state marriages, the Second
Restatement directs courts to consider the law of the state with the "most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage" and to the issue
involved in the particular case. 2 What state has the "most significant
relationship" is determined by consulting the factors in section 6.'
Having determined which state has this "most significant relationship,"
the court should, using section 283(2), then consider the marriage to be
valid if it was valid where celebrated "unless it violates the strong public
policy" of the state with the most significant relationship to the
marriage.' Reese notes that the primary values involved are
protection of the parties' expectations in intending to enter into a valid
marriage, and recognition of the general policy favoring validation of
marriages.' The Second Restatement, although clearly tending toward
validation as a general rule, also attempts to protect "the interest of a
State in not having its domiciliaries contract marriages of which it
disapproves"' and would defer to the domiciliary state, as the state
with the most significant relationship to the couple, to consider whether
a given marriage violates its public policy.' Again, this analysis
339. Id. Those factors are: (a) the needs of the interstate and international
systems; (b) the relevant policies of the forum; (c) the relevant policies of other interested
states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue;
(d) the protection of justified expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law; (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and (g) ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra
note 169, § 6.
340. Smith, supra note 282, at 1044.
341. Kay, supra note 283, at 555. Kay notes that Reese made clear that section
6 is not a rule, but rather an approach. It does not function as a rule by providing courts
with a formula that will lead to a conclusion but instead lists relevant factors to consider.
Id. (citing Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV.
315 (1972)).
342. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 169, § 283(1).
343. Id. § 6.
344. Id. § 283(2).
345. Reese, supra note 23, at 967.
346. Id. at 965.
347. Baade rejects § 283(2) as a "tool for the rational solution of conflicts
problems" because it does not properly inquire into underlying governmental interests.
Baade, supra note 168, at 358-61.
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potentially leaves the court significant discretion to determine whether
such a strong public policy exists and, if so, what that policy is.
Borchers indicates that Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah and Washington all
follow the Second Restatement.348  Of these states, Arizona,
Connecticut, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois,
Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Utah have validation
statutes, which could be used to argue that public policy supports
recognition of our couple's marriage.' This argument would probably
not work in Utah which also prohibits same-sex marriage. Arizona,
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, and
Mississippi have evasion statutes, but because only Indiana prohibits
same-sex marriage, precedent can be used in the other states to argue that
the evasion statute does not apply .3 Texas also prohibits same-sex
marriage, and its additional prohibition of sodomy may lead its courts to
conclude that a Same-sex marriage would offend its public policy.3 15
Much room exists in the Second Restatement states to advocate for
recognition of our couple's same-sex marriage.
4. LEFLAR'S CHOICE-INFLUENCING CONSIDERATIONS
Finally, Robert Leflar's "choice-influencing considerations" theory
attempts to focus on those factors that influence courts in their choice-of-
law analysis.352 Leflar's considerations include: (1) predictability of
result, (2) maintenance of interstate and international order, (3)
simplification of the judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum's
348. Borchers, supra note 279, at 373 & n. 113. Borchers considers the District
of Columbia, Louisiana, Pennsylvania and Oregon to be problematic jurisdictions, because
these states combine interest analysis with the Second Restatement. North Dakota uses
a center of gravity approach which is quite similar to the Second Restatement. Id. Kay
and Smith disagree about several of these states. Kay, supra note 284, at 591-92; Smith,
supra note 282, at 1172-74.
349. See supra part II.A.
350. See supra part II.B..
351. See supra note 216. The lower courts of Texas, however, have declared its
sodomy statute to be unconstitutional. Gross, supra note 17, at B12. Additional Second
Restatement states with sodomy statutes include Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Utah. Id. Missouri and Texas are the only Second
Restatement states which prohibit same-sex sodomy, id., so it would be possible to argue
in the other states that public policy, as expressed in the sodomy statute, does not indicate
a clear condemnation of a gay or lesbian lifestyle.
352. Smith, supra note 282, at 1049.
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governmental interests, and (5) application of the better rule of law.353
Excepting the better rule of law consideration, Leflar's factors resemble
the factors listed in section 6 of the Second Restatement.3 ' The theory
is extremely flexible and allows courts to apply a law that the other
theories would not permit but which would be appropriate in a particular
case. 355 The better rule of law consideration-one that finds no parallel
in section 6 of the Second Restatement-is one that has proven most
controversial, due to fears that it would lead courts to give inadequate
deference to the forum state's legislation, or that it would lead to an
uncritical application of forum law. 3' Leflar accepts the first objection
but rejects the second, believing that judges are "perfectly capable" of
realizing when local forum law is not better, and should have the freedom
to ignore the disfavored local law that would otherwise control in
domestic cases. 357  Thus, if a court were willing to recognize the
progressive nature of Hawaii's decision to permit same-sex marriages, it
could use Leflar's theory, and the better rule of law, to validate our
couple's marriage.35
Borchers lists Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
and Wisconsin as following Leflar's approach in choice-of-law cases.
Additionally, Arkansas and Minnesota have validation statutes, which in
combination with the better rule of law argument, could lead those courts
to validate our couple's marriage. 59 Wisconsin has an evasion statute
but since it does not also prohibit same-sex marriage, and in fact has
numerous statutes expressly prohibiting differential treatment of gay men
and lesbians, the Wisconsin evasion statute may not prohibit our couple's
same-sex marriage.' °
5. CONSIDERING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE UNDER THESE APPROACHES
Regardless of the approach used by any particular state, advocates
will find significant general support for validation of our couple's same-
sex marriage as the starting point under each approach. Commentators,
ranging from Leflar, MacDougal and Felix,"' to Richman and
353. Id.
354. Kay, supra note 284, at 563.
355. Smith, supra note 282, at 1049.
356. Kay, supra note 284, at 564.
357. Id.
358. See infra part III. Becausepart I1.lA. specifically focuses on Leflar's theory,
this part is abbreviated in comparison to the others above.
359. See supra part II.A.
360. See supra part I1.B.
361. See LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 180, §§ 219-221.
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Reynolds, 2 and Scoles and Hay,' tend to treat marriage as a
relatively settled area of choice-of-law. None of them, however, have
anticipated what will happen when a domicile that does not recognize
same-sex marriage is faced with a challenge to a resident couple's same-
sex marriage celebrated in a state which recognizes its validity.
Courts have an overwhelming tendency to validate marriages, using
either the First Restatement's lex celebrationis, which recognizes marriage
as a status question and looks to the state creating the status to determine
its validity, or using modern theories which protect parties' expectations,
provide stability, and avoid the "hideous" problems that result when one's
marital status varies from state to state.' Considerations such as
providing predictability for the parties involved and protecting interstate
order would lead to validation, whether considered under Leflar's
theory' or sections 6(a) and (f) of the Second Restatement. Following
the approach often taken in contracts cases, states will validate the
marriage to protect the parties' expectations, unless doing so would offend
a state's strongly held public policy."
This exception for a state's public policy recognizes the role of
Currie's governmental interest analysis and section 6(b) of the Second
Restatement in protecting the purpose behind a state's marriage laws. It
also fits within Leflar's emphasis on the forum state's interest in applying
its law when its domiciliaries leave the state to marry in another state
which permits a marriage not allowed to be celebrated within the
domicile. 7 All of these modern theories leave it to the court to
consider the strength of the domicile's policies underlying particular
marital regulations, which will vary from state to state, although based on
similar regulations and prohibitions.' Thus, to determine whether our
couple is validly married, most courts will find that it is "(a) the whole
law of the domicile, including its conflicts rules, that we should look to
in the first instance; and (b) its conflicts rules will ordinarily refer the
question to the law of the place of performance, which will usually
sustain the marriage; but (c) in some cases its reference will be to its own
internal marriage laws. " '
362. See RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 176, § 116.
363. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 250, §§ 13.1-13.18.
364. RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 176, § 116, at 362.
365. LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 180, § 220, at 605.
366. RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 176, § 116, at 363.
367. LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 180, § 220, at 606.
368. Id.
369. Id.; see also Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942) ('Each
state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital status of persons
domiciled within its borders.").
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But what result? The tendency to validate the marriage, which many
commentators recognize as extremely strong,3" will be countered by the
overwhelming homophobia existing in the judiciary today. 7" Courts
will be able to refuse recognition of our couple's marriage by choosing
to group it with cases of incest and polygamy which comprise the most
frequent examples of invalidity."' Perhaps a more exact match would
be miscegenous marriages, which are conceptually similar to same-sex
marriages.3" By studying the history of the change from prohibiting
miscegenous marriages to finding them constitutionally protected, we
discover a suitable analogy supporting validation of our couple's same-sex
marriage in their domicile.
III. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE BErrER RULE OF LAW
Having considered the statutory guidance provided by the legislature
and starting from the premise that a court will use the choice-of-law
approach currently in effect in that state, it may seem unrealistic to end
this Article with a section pleading for courts to consider the better rule
of law when deciding whether to recognize our couple's same-sex
marriage. While this plea may be considered in Arkansas, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin, that is because those
states have already adopted Leflar's choice-influencing considerations as
their approach for resolving choice-of-law problems. 7 While it is
unrealistic to expect the other states to switch approaches, it could be
beneficial for advocates to argue that, when considering the policy
considerations or governmental interests behind various statutes or public
policies, courts should conclude that recognizing same-sex marriage is the
better public policy. This result will advance the state's interest in ending
370. LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 180, at 605; RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 176,
§ 116, at 362; SCOLES & HAY, supra note 250, § 13.5, at 436.
371. See Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HAsTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
372. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 250, § 13.5, at 436.
373. See generally Ehrenzweig, supra note 170.
374. In his summary chart, Smith notes that Alaska uses Leflar's theory but the
text describing Alaska's choice-of-law approach is not consistent with that categorization.
Smith, supra note 282, at 1051-52, 1172. He also notes that Hawaii also uses Leflar, but
if Hawaii becomes the only state to allow same-sex marriage, it will not face the choice-
of-law question. Additionally, since Hawaii's law would coincide with the foreign law,
it would presumably validate a foreign same-sex marriage. Reppy argues that California
uses the better law, by its use of comparative impairment, as a break choice for true
conflicts. Reppy, supra note 283, at 673-74, 706. Thus, the better law approach might
persuade California courts as well as the others noted.
1994:1033 1099
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
discrimination just as recognizing miscegenous marriages advanced that
same interest.
In addition to the five states which will consider the better rule of
law under their current approach, fifteen states use the First Restatement,
which points toward validation unless contrary to a strong public policy.
This traditionally has been a very narrow exception based on a clear
statutory expression of that policy. Another twenty-four states use the
Second Restatement, which first points to statutory directives (which
should guide a court toward validation), and then urges the domicile state
(the one with the most significant relationship to the marriage under
section 6) to recognize the marriage as valid under section 283(2) unless
it violates its strong public policy. Except for states which have expressly
forbidden same-sex marriage, courts should not find a strong public
policy from the absence of a statute permitting same-sex marriage.
"Similarity of legislation has indeed this importance; its presence shows
beyond question that the foreign statute does not offend the local policy.
But its absence does not prove the contrary."375 The remaining seven
states which use either interest analysis or some other approach could be
persuaded that governmental interests would be advanced by prohibiting
discrimination.
Borchers notes that courts often consider the better rule of law (the
one leading to the result that they favor) despite their claimed adoption of
a particular theoretical approach.
If, as I suggest, the new theories usually amount to little
more than long-winded excuses to do what courts wanted to do
*in the first place, one may ask whether the current state of
affairs is satisfactory. It seems to me that counsel, courts and
parties would be better off if judges would admit candidly-as
do courts in states that follow Leflar's approach-that
substantive preferences control results in multistate cases.376
Because all the approaches do leave the judges in a position to reach
the result that they believe is best, the parties litigating these cases need
to explain and educate the judges as to why recognizing same-sex
marriage is the better result. "If, as I suggest, the real issue in conflicts
cases is the relative merits of the rules, counsel and lower courts are
likely to be of much more help to higher courts if they are pointed in the
right direction. " "
375. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918).
376. Borchers, supra note 279, at 382.
377. Id. at 383.
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Pointing these courts in the right direction means explaining why
Hawaii's rule recognizing same-sex marriage is better:
[Nione of the modern theories acts as a substantial check on
judicial discretion. In practice, courts appear to reach their
preferred substantive results, and-except for Leflar's theory
that allows courts to admit their substantive preferences-the
new theories are little more than veils for the real reasoning of
courts. As a consequence, choice of law in the United States is
at the crossroads. Either we can admit that results are the
primary determinant in multistate torts [and other] cases, or we
can retreat to a regime resembling the First Restatement. In my
view, the preferable road is for us to get on with the business
of admitting that results are important. 78
This Part, recognizing that results are important, argues for applying
the various choice-of-law theories in a better manner to resolve these
disputes. In these cases, the better result would be to recognize the same-
sex marriage. Such a result is better because it eliminates age-old
discrimination based on prejudice and misunderstanding, and because it
eliminates overzealous state interference with and condemnation of a most
personal and intimate relationship. Thus, same-sex marriage should not
violate forum public policy.
The first sub-part explores the numerous choice-of-law theories
which include a factor considering the better rule of law when
determining which law to apply in conflicts cases. Courts considering
whether to validate a same-sex marriage should recognize the step taken
by the Baehr court toward ending age-old discrimination against same-sex
marriages, in much the same way that the Court led the way toward
ending discrimination against interracial couples in Loving v. Virginia,
and find that the better result would be to validate the marriage.
The second sub-part considers, as analogous, the legal revolution
which rejected anti-miscegenation statutes on the basis of irrational
prejudice. The need for this revolution was seen in the numerous choice-
of-law cases that had to determine whether states should recognize
interracial marriages entered into by couples fleeing prejudicial laws.
The third sub-part concludes that the choice-of-law cases which will
arise once any state recognizes same-sex marriage will again provide an
opportunity for courts to reject similar antiquated restrictions. Some
choice-of-law theories exist that offer the chance to recognize the
progressive tendencies driving the Hawaii court's rejection of
378. Id. at 384.
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discrimination against same-sex couples. Courts using theories which
recognize the better rule of law as an important factor in making difficult
policy decisions may be led to accept same-sex marriages, hopefully
without having to wait for Supreme Court insistence. That progression
will lead to the gradual acceptance of same-sex marriage, even if not
statutorily protected in many states for years to come. The choice-of-law
question, resolved in a better manner, can lead this revolution.
A. Recognizing the Better Rule of Law
Analyzing court decisions using the various modern theories (chiefly
Currie's interest analysis, the Second Restatement, and Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations), one discovers that the results are "largely
indistinguishable."" 9 Given this lack of distinction in results, this sub-
part argues that when courts are faced with the case of a resident couple's
same-sex marriage, those courts should follow the better rule of law and
validate the marriage, rather than manipulate public policy to reject
it.380
Numerous choice-of-law theories consider the better rule of law when
determining which law to use. These theories encourage courts to throw
off the provincialism of preferring the lexfori3l1 and instead recognize
379. Id. at 383-84; RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 176, § 82, at 242. Borchers does
find that results under the First Restatement differ from those reached under modem
theories. Borchers, supra note 279, at 383. But courts following the First Restatement
do use escape devices that could lead to results that would be the same as under the
modem theories. RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 176, § 82, at 242 n.8. This is particularly
true in out-of-state marriage cases given § 132's express "escape device" allowing
consideration of state public policy.
380. As noted above, courts that do not currently include "the better rule of law"
in their choice-of-law considerations should be urged to use the same type of analysis and
find that validation is "the better public policy." Numerous expressions of state public
policy, including marriage validation statutes, evasion statutes that do not include same-
sex marriages within their provisions, and anti-discrimination statutes or case law, would
support recognizing same-sex marriage.
381. Theories which tend to promote use of the lexfori include Brainerd Currie's
governmental-interest theory and Albert A. Ehrenzweig's lex-fori approach. SCOLES &
HAY, supra note 250, § 2.6, at 15; see Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives
in the Conflicts of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 178. Currie argues that "[niormally, even
in cases involving foreign elements, the court should be expected as a matter of course,
to apply the rule of decision found in the law of the forum." Id. In circumstances of
"true" conflicts (when the laws differ and the policies underlying each call for its
application), the forum will apply its own law. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 250, §2.6,
at 17; see Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Lex-Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58
MICH. L. REV. 637 (1960) (proposing that the substantive rule of the forum should apply
as "residuary" law when the foreign rule does not apply under constitutional "superlaw"
or the forum's choice of law rules, and that an interpretation of the forum's law does not
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progressive opportunities to avoid discriminatory, restrictive laws. When
a court is faced with choosing the law of another forum, which is more
progressive and signals a trend toward ending discrimination, or choosing
its own law, which tends toward prejudice and condemnation, it should
forego its reflex response to choose forum law. Instead, the court should
recognize the opportunity to develop progressive jurisprudence within its
state via the conflicts cases.
Perhaps the best known of the theories which would support such an
argument is that developed by Robert Leflar. Leflar tries to identify goals
and objectives that would lead courts to formulate new rules, 3" and
focuses on choice-influencing considerations, including "the application
of the better rule of law." 3" Leflar indicates that "justice in the
individual case" is the ultimate result to be achieved in choice-of-law
cases."8 He believes that the better law would be the one that upholds
a "fair transaction entered into by the parties in good faith," including a
marriage."9 He refers to Albert Ehrenzweig's "basic rule of validity,"
which would validate a marriage if valid where celebrated, where one of
the parties was domiciled at the time of the marriage, or where the parties
were domiciled at the time of the suit.3"6
Leflar does recognize that looking to the better rule might lead
judges to the forum's own law, especially if foreign law might "interfere
with fundamental local policies." 3
It is evident that the search for the better rule of law may
lead a court almost automatically to its own lawbooks. The idea
that the forum's own law is the best in the world, especially
better than fancy new sets of laws based on such nontraditional
approaches as research and policy analysis, is unfortunately but
understandably still current among some members of our high
courts."38
lead to displacement of the forum law); SCOLES & HAY, supra note 250, §2.7, at 20-21.
Additionally, Kentucky and Michigan have adopted the lex fori as their approach to
resolving choice-of-law questions in torts cases. See supra note 283.
382. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 250, § 2.10, at 27.
383. Leflar, supra note 175, at 295-304. Leflar's other considerations are
predictability of results, maintenance of interstate and international order, simplification
of the judicial task, and advancement of the forum's governmental interests. Id. at 282.
384. Id. at 296.
385. Id. at 297.
386. Id. (citing ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIO, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139, at 378
(1962)). Ehrenzweig does indicate the marriage could be invalid if offensive to an
overriding policy of the forum. id.; see also Ehrenzweig, supra note 170.
387. Leflar, supra note 175, at 297.
388. Id. at 298.
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He does not believe, however, that this will always be true3s9 and
finds an automatic preference of forum law to be unjustifiable."l
Leflar believes that judges can appreciate that their forum law is
anachronistic, behind the times, or a "drag on the coat tails of
civilization."39' He refers to Sunday laws, fellow-servant rules, and
married women's incapacity to contract as illustrations." Archaic laws
should yield to more progressive ones, thereby serving one of choice-of-
laws' functions as "growing pains for the law of a state, at all events in
a federation such as our own." 3'
When a court finds itself faced with a choice between such
anachronistic laws still hanging on in one state, and realistic
practical modern rules in another state, with both states having
substantial connection with the relevant facts, it would be
surprising if the court's choice did not incline toward the
superior law. A court sufficiently aware of the relation between
law and societal needs to recognize superiority of one rule over
another will seldom be restrained in its choice by the fact that
the outmoded rule happens still to prevail in its own state. One
way or another it will normally choose the law that makes good
sense when applied to the facts.3"
Leflar believes that judges are "perfectly capable" of preferring rules
of law that "make good socio-economic sense for the time when the court
speaks."395 Judges concerned with "justice in the individual case" and
"protection of justified expectations of the parties" should prefer the
better rule of law.3" It seems likely that judges considering these
factors would recognize our couple's marriage in Hawaii.
Among the other theories that could support this type of argument
are those of Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman, which focus
on a principled weighing of conflicting policies.397 One principle to be
389. id.
390. Id. at 299.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 299 n.113.
393. Id. (citing Paul A. Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59
HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1216 (1946)).
394. Id. at 300.
395. Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,
54 CAL. L. REV. 1584, 1588 (1966).
396. Id.
397. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 250, § 2.8, at 24. Von Mehren and Trautman
explain their theory in ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW
OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 342-75 (1965), and von Mehren's Recent Trends in Choice-of-
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weighed is "the choice of the law reflecting an 'emerging' policy over
one embodying a 'regressive' policy."398 In determining the strength
of the state's conviction behind its policy, one should consider whether
the policy is regressing or emerging. Under their considerations, a
policy which does not reflect an emerging trend should be limited in
application and seen as the weaker policy.' Russel J. Weintraub also
advocates a weighing approach and includes criteria such as (1) advancing
a clearly discernible trend in the law and (2) avoiding anachronistic or
aberrational rules."' The criterion considering anachronism and
aberration favors a rule that is "more representative of current
developments."' His approach tends to focus the court's attention
away from forum law.'
David Cavers would appraise the results "from the standpoint of
justice between the litigating individuals or ... broader considerations of
social policy."' He believes that "principles of preference" should be
developed to direct courts in resolving choice-of-law cases.' Cavers
is reluctant to accept the better law criterion as one of his principles of
preference because he is concerned that the choice of which law is better
might not always be principled.' But he does recognize that the better
rule of law is influential as an "inevitable psychological reaction in
marginal cases." 7  Friedrich K. Juenger adopts use of the better law
Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927 (1975).
398. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 250, § 2.8, at 24.
399. VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 397, at 377. In examining the
distinction between emerging and regressing trends, the court can consider the policy
trends of the states on the whole. Id. at 394.
400. Id.
401. RUSSEL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6.4,
at 284, § 6.6, at 287-88 (3d ed. 1986); see also SCOLES & HAY, supra note 249, § 2.8,
at 24.
402. WEINTRAUB, supra note 401, § 6.6, at 289.
403. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 250, §2.8, at 25. Weintraub would only use the
"better law" criterion when the conflict is not spurious and when the better law is chosen
by objective standards. WEINTRAUB, supra note 401, § 6.27, at 343 (citing Friedrich
Juenger, Choice of Law in interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 202, 235 (1969)).
404. David Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV.
173, 192-93 (1933).
405. David Cavers, The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEX. L. REV. 211,
212 (1971).
406. Id. at 215.
407. Id. Additionally, Cavers would not resort to any of these principles unless
he found that the conflict was neither false nor avoidable. To make this decision, courts
should examine the laws in conflict, their purposes, and the circumstances of the case.
DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 137 (1965). Further, Cavers'
principles might lead a court to consider whether the domicile had enacted its restrictive
laws to protect its domiciliaries, and whether the marriage in Hawaii or another state was
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as his principal guiding factor in resolving conflicts cases.' Although
first questioning the propriety of using conflicts law for result selectivity,
Juenger concludes that if courts are free to resolve choice-of-law cases in
a result-selective manner, the better rule of law "must be considered
seriously."' Juenger explains this problem succinctly when discussing
marriage and divorce restrictions, and private international law.
These examples, drawn from several countries, should suffice
to indicate the role of teleology in domestic relations conflict of
laws. When the realization that overly strict requirements for
marriage and divorce are bound to increase human misery
without a corresponding benefit began to spread, nations [and
states] reformed their laws accordingly, but not all of them at
the same time. How did the law of conflicts respond to the fact
that, for religious and political reasons, some lagged
behind?41°
He goes on to note: "Reform may take time. . . . Continued rebuffs
from abroad do, however, clarify that all is not well in domestic law and
they put the onus of reform squarely where it belongs."411
All of these theories recognize that the better law may be considered
residually, at least, when other criteria do not lead to a clear resolution
of the conflict.412 This use of the better law would tend to temper "the
normal forum preference with consideration of developing trends of the
law with respect to the particular area in issue when there is no express
legislative direction or prior case law." 413
The problem is that, even when used residually, a judge considering
the better law will often turn to forum law. 414  "The judge applying
foreign law is a dilettante, a beginner; he [or she] is timid. The judge
entered into manipulatively to evade the domicile's law. If it answered these questions
in the affirmative, the court would probably apply the domicile's law. Appleton, supra
note 322, at 428.
408. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 250, § 2.3, at 11 n.14; see also Friedrich
Juenger, Leflar's Contributions to American Conflicts Law, 31 S.C. L. REV. 413 (1980);
Friedrich Juenger, Mass Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105,
126.
409. Juenger, supra note 403, at 233.
410. FRIEDRICH JUENOER, CHOICEOF LAW AND MULTISTATEJUSTICE 228 (1993).
411. Id. at 231.
412. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 250, § 2.11, at 30.
413. Id.
414. Id.
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applying the lex fori is a learned expert; he [or she] is a sovereign,
superior. " 415
Most of the cases which have adopted the "better law" approach
have found the forum's law to be the better law.416 But Borchers'
recent exhaustive study of conflicts cases concluded that, although
Leflar's approach should favor forum law, his data do not support that
conclusion." 7 Courts using the "better law" approach have chosen to
apply foreign law when they considered it to be better than forum law.
For example; in Schlemmer v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,41s
the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that the Arkansas guest statute
in effect at the time of the accident was "archaic and unfair"419 and
instead applied Tennessee law. It stated: "Courts sometimes realize that
certain of their own laws, especially statutory ones, are archaic,
anachronistic, out of keeping with the times. . . . Some states have
recently repealed [guest statutes], though it is not as easy to repeal an
archaic statute as it would be to prevent its current enactment if it were
not already law." 4'
Similarly, in Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Co.,4 1 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that Ohio's liability statute which barred third-party
suits against co-employees was "better" than Wisconsin's law which
permitted such suits. The court reiterated its position that it would,
"without hesitation, if other choice-influencing considerations were in
equilibrium, select the rule of another jurisdiction if analysis convinced
us that it indeed constituted the better law." 4' It then determined that
the Ohio law banning suits was not a "vestige of 'a creed outworn'" and
noted that although many states permitted third-party suits, the trend in
recent years was toward barring the suits.4  Because it could not
conclude that Wisconsin's rule "unmistakably represents the better law,"
it applied Ohio's law and barred the suit. 42 In another torts case, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals also had "no difficulty in applying the law"
of Illinois because it recognized that Wisconsin was "in the minority on
415. id. § 2.11, at 29-30.
416. Id. § 2.11, at 31.
417. Borchers, supra note 279, at 378.
418. 730 S.W.2d 217 (Ark. 1987).
419. Id. at 219.
420. Id.
421. 57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W.2d 897 (1973).
422. Id. at 907.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 908.
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the issue of allowing economic damage in a tort case, [which] weighs in
favor of the application of Illinois law." 425
The United States District Court for Rhode Island, in Gravina v.
Brunswick Corp., applied Illinois law in a right of privacy case
because the court found it to be "better" than Rhode Island law, which
denied a cause of action. The court stated:
The final question to be considered is which of the
conflicting rules of law is the better one. For the answer the
court only has to note the steady trend toward recognition of the
right of privacy by jurisdictions across the country ever since
the elements of the right were first articulated by Warren and
Brandeis in 1890 .... The court feels that the right of privacy
is destined for universal recognition and it applauds this destiny
as founded in the most basic concepts of human rights. For the
purposes of this conflict of laws analysis, the Illinois
law-recognition at common law of the tort of invasion of
privacy-must be deemed the better rule of law.427
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Minnesota followed the better
rule of law to find that Iowa's survival statute was preferable to
Minnesota's in Bigelow v. Halloran.42 The court recognized that
Minnesota's statute was "a remnant of the early common law" and that
"the modern trend" was that tort causes of action should survive
death.4' Because the state's interest was to compensate its tort victims
fully, Minnesota's statutory bar against intentional tort claims after one
party's death undermined that interest. The court reasoned that it should
"'prefer rules of law which make good socio-economic sense for the time
when the court speaks, whether they be its own or another state's
rules.'"43
425. Edward E. Gillen Co. v. Valders Stone and Marble, Inc., No. 90-1157, 1990
WL 262093, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991) (This is an unpublished opinion, which
has no precedential value. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 809.23(3) (West 1993). It is mentioned
here simply as another example of courts finding foreign law to be better than forum
law.).
426. 338 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.R.I. 1972).
427. id. at 6 (citation omitted).
428. 313 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. 1981).
429. Id. at 12.
430. Id. at 13 (citing Leflar, supra note 395, at 1588). In fact, one commentator
has noted that Minnesota's governmental interest, Leflar's fourth consideration, would
always be to apply the "just" law, which would also be the "better" law. Reppy, supra
note 283, at 694.
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As these cases establish, courts are perfectly able to select foreign
law as the "better rule" in appropriate situations." Using the language
of the courts mentioned above, advocates could argue that state laws
which do not recognize same-sex marriage are "archaic and unfair."
Same-sex couples are the only adults, other than those who violate some
additional statutory proscription, who are not freely permitted to marry
the partner of their choice. Restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples
can also be seen as merely continuing "the vestige of a creed outworn"
or "a remnant of early common law." Social and legal trends, as seen
from the passage of consenting adults statutes, repeal of sodomy statutes,
and provision of domestic partner benefits, are toward recognizing the
validity of same-sex relationships. Allowing same-sex couples to make
legal commitments to one another and to protect and preserve their
intimate relationships by obtaining recognition and benefits from society
and the state "make[s] good socio-economic sense" in the 1990s.
Although commentators fear that advocating the better law approach
might result in its overuse, even when not needed because other
considerations would resolve the question,432 this approach would be
particularly useful in difficult cases, such as those involving same-sex
marriages. In same-sex marriage choice-of-law cases, a judge is faced
with a case of first impression, which will have a significant impact on all
parties as well as on countless individuals outside the litigation. State
policy considerations lead in countless directions, from those validating
marriage and protecting individuals' expectations to those condemning
lesbian or gay lifestyles, and from those validating marriage when
conflicting laws exist to those urging protection of local public policy.
If the better law approach were taken, strong arguments would exist for
applying the law leading to recognition of same-sex marriage.
As Chief Justice Kenison stated in Clark v. Clark:433 "If it is our
own law that is obsolete or senseless (and it could be) we will try to apply
the other state's law." 4" But J.H.C. Morris responded:
431. For additional eases that applied foreign law, see Williams v. Carr, 565
S.W.2d 400 (Ark. 1978); McGinity v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 408 S.W.2d 891 (Ark.
1966); Hoffman v. Henderson, 355 N.W.2d 322 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Schneider v.
Schneider, 260 A.2d 97 (N.H. 1969); Busby v. Perini Corp., 290 A.2d 210 (R.I. 1972);
Lichter v. Fritsch, 77 Wis. 2d 178, 252 N.W.2d 360 (1977); Peterson v. Warren, 31 Wis.
2d 547, 143 N.W.2d 560 (1966), overruled on other grounds, Allen v. Ross, 38 Wis. 2d
209, 215, 156 N.W.2d 434, 438 (1968); Burns v. Geres, 105 Wis. 2d 764, 409 N.W.2d
428 (Ct. App. 1987); Pitts v. Mut. Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d 197, 318
N.W.2d 23 (Ct. App. 1981).
432. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 250, § 2.11, at 31.
433. 222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966).
434. Id. at 209.
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"And it could be": there's the rub. Could it be? Is there any
case in which a court has said "Our law on this point is a drag
on the coat-tails of civilization; if our legislature won't repeal
it, we will give it the narrowest possible scope; whenever it
conflicts with the law of another state concerned (however
remotely), we will apply the other state's law."? I doubt it. 5
However, there is reason to believe, especially given the cases
above, that if the argument were presented by proponents urging
validation of same-sex marriage, courts might be inclined to recognize
Hawaii's law and validate the marriage, because that law is more
enlightened and progressive. Consider the case of Perez v. Lippold'
and the evolution the California Supreme Court led in striking down
California's miscegenation statute. That evolution concluded nineteen
years later with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Loving v.
Virginia finding all miscegenation statutes to be unconstitutional.
Likewise, Baehr may lead to a similar evolution. Despite its defects, 4 7
Baehr is clearly a more reasoned and analytically sound decision than
Jones, Singer, Baker, and other cases which preceded it." 8 In Baehr,
the court recognized the numerous disabilities imposed on same-sex
couples who are prohibited from marrying, and refused to allow
tautological, definitional excuses to prevent it from recognizing the clear
discrimination that exists in precluding same-sex couples from marrying.
By granting significant leeway in making the choice-of-law decision
necessary when same-sex couples, married in Hawaii, return to their
domiciles, the "better law" approach provides a theoretical basis for
guiding courts to enlightened decisions.
B. Choice-of-Law Cases Based on Miscegenation Restrictions Lead to
Overruling Anti-Miscegenation Statutes
The miscegenation cases are similar in many respects to the case of
our couple. Those cases usually involved domiciliaries who left their
home state to marry abroad and returned to live in that state.439 Some
435. J.H.C. Morris, Law and Reason Triumphant or How Not to Review a
Restatement, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 322, 324 (1973). But see the cases cited supra notes
418-30 for decisions in which courts were able to determine that a foreign state's law was
"better" and should be followed.
436. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948); see infra text accompanying note 471.
437. See supra part I.B. (discussing the Baehr court's refusal to extend the
fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples).
438. See supra notes 74-76.
439. Taintor, supra note 294, at 628.
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state statutes included anti-evasion provisions which were used to
invalidate marriages under these circumstances.' When no evasion
provision existed, it was left to the judge to determine whether the local
policy was strong enough to overcome the general rule validating
marriages if valid where celebrated."'
Most of the southern courts refused to recognize these marriages,
although other states did recognize them. An example of the policies
behind the statutes used to invalidate these marriages can be found in
Kinney v. Commonwealth,"' where an interracial couple's marriage,
celebrated in the District of Columbia, was declared void.
The purity of public morals, the moral and physical
development of both races, and the highest advancement of our
cherished southern civilization . . . require that [the races]
should be kept distinct and separate, and that connections and
alliances so unnatural that God and nature seem to forbid them
should be prohibited by positive law, and be subject to no
evasion." 3
In contrast, consider Medway v. Needham,' where an interracial
couple was married in Rhode Island, and the marriage was found to be
valid in Massachusetts. In considering the state's policy behind its anti-
miscegenation statute, the court found the marriage to be valid under the
general rule validating marriages, and limited invalidity to cases involving
incest." '5 The court drew a distinction between prohibited marriages
based on "political expediency," which the forum would nevertheless
tolerate, and those "which would tend to outrage the principles and
feelings of all civilized nations," which it would not." The difference
in results between these two cases can be explained by the weight given
to the domicile's policies, which were dependent on local conditions and
mores.
447
The purpose behind the miscegenation statutes was similar to the
purpose behind the restrictions on gay and lesbian sexuality and marriage.
440. Rebecca Bailey-Harris, Madame Butterfly and the Conflict of Laws, 39 AM.
J. COMP. L. 157, 173 (1991).
441.. Id.
442. 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858 (1878).
443. Id. at 699.
444. 16 Mass. 157 (1819).
445. Bailey-Harris, supra note 440, at 175.
446. Id..
447. Id.
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Although concerned with sodomy laws specifically, the following explains
the caste system which these laws were developed to maintain.
[S]odomy and miscegenation statutes violate the equal protection
clause for the same reason: Beyond the immediate harm they
inflict upon their victims, their purpose is to support a regime
of caste that locks some people into inferior social positions at
birth. Miscegenation laws discriminated on the basis of race,
and they did so in order to maintain white supremacy.
Similarly, sodomy laws [and prohibitions on same-sex marriage]
discriminate on the basis of sex-for example, permitting men,
but not women, to have sex with women-in order to impose
traditional sex roles." 8
Supporting such a racially-based caste system was clearly the purpose
of the State of Virginia's declared statutory policy in Loving. The United
States Supreme Court noted that "the State's legitimate purposes were 'to
preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,' and to prevent 'the corruption
of blood,' ' a mongrel breed of citizens,' and 'the obliteration of racial
pride,' obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White
Supremacy."" 9 These prohibitions against interracial marriage were
enacted to preserve the "polarities of race on which white supremacy
rested." 4" Interracial marriage called into question the "distinctive and
superior status of being white.""' For that reason, it had to be
prevented with the entire power of the State.
Anti-miscegenation statutes did not exist at common law or in
England, but were instead developed in the United States. 2
Justifications behind the earliest miscegenation laws included maintaining
clear racial boundaries in a society based on African-American slavery,
and promoting whites' belief in their racial superiority, by describing
interracial sex as "a 'disgrace' that would result in 'spurious issues,'
[which] reinforced colonial perceptions that Blacks had a 'beastly'
sexuality."45 3 These laws also perpetuated and protected the slavery
448. Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex
Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 147 (1988).
449. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d
749, 756 (Va. 1955)).
450. Koppelman, supra note 448, at 158.
451. Id. at 159.
452. Kenneth J. Lay, Sexual Racism.: A Lega( y of Slavery, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J.
165, 165 (1993).
453. Id. at 166.
1112
Same-Sex Marriages
system to prevent obscuring the racial barriers necessary to maintaining
the caste-based system of slavery.'
Since the racially based systems of slavery that developed
in the New World were premised on the concept of the racial
inferiority of the enslaved, it would have been far simpler had
there been no intermingling of races, no anomalous offspring,
no confusion of the 'natural order' by beings who did not
clearly belong to one rather than another of the three
populations of Indians, Africans, and Europeans. But human
sexual behavior did not respect the 'natural order,' and mixed-
race children invariably sprang up wherever the races had
contact.4 55
Whites disturbed by racial intermingling introduced laws to prevent this
"abominable mixture and spurious issue. " 4%
The "two distinct races" had, in fact, been mixing for some 250
years, but the myth of the "pure white race" was used to support social
and legal action and to justify oppression of non-whites. 7 The laws
prohibiting voluntary interracial sex imposed much harsher penalties on
whites than non-whites, because maintaining white racial purity and
sexual morality was considered whites' particular responsibility. 8
This desire to maintain white supremacy increased over the years as
the laws defining who was "white" became obsessive. While it had been
true that "white" included anyone with one less than one-eighth African-
American blood, by 1900 the laws defined "mulatto" as anyone having
any "portion or perceptible traces of Negro blood." 459 The justification
was racial purity, but the need for it came from a desire for white
supremacy. Intermixture between blacks and whites "would soon prevent
those able to exploit the race issue from being able to direct mass hatred
against blacks" which was needed to maintain economic exploitation of
African-Americans.' In order to sustain the caste-system based on
454. Id. at 167.
455. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and
Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1970
(1989).
456. Id. (citing Act 16, 3 Laws of Va. 86, 86 (Hening 1923) (enacted 1691)).
457. Id. at 1983.
458. id. at 2000-01.
459. Lay, supra note 452, at 170.
460. DERRICK A., BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW § 2.3, at 75 (3d
ed. 1992).
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race, children of interracial couples had to be deemed to fall into the
lower caste.
Perhaps [the colonist] sensed as well that continued racial
intermixture would eventually undermine the logic of the racial
slavery upon which his society was based. For the separation
of slaves from free men depended on a clear demarcation of the
races, and the presence of mulattoes blurred this essential
distinction. Accordingly, he made every effort to nullify the
effects of racial intermixture. By classifying the mulatto as a
Negro he was in effect denying that intermixture had occurred
at all. 4 '
Virginia's "Racial Integrity Act" of 1924 demonstrates this denial of
racial intermixture with its definition of "Negro" as including anyone with
a "single drop of Negro blood." 2 These laws were intended to
perpetuate a belief that African-Americans were low in status and unfit for
equal treatment with whites, as can be seen from Chief Justice Taney's
opinion in the Dred Scot decision.' There he wrote that "a perpetual
and impassable barrier was intended to be erected between the white race
and the one which they had reduced to slavery, . . . and ... looked upon
as so far below them in the scale of created beings, that intermarriage
between white persons and negroes or mulattoes were regarded as
unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes. " '
A significant difference between the miscegenation cases and cases
regarding same-sex marriages is that all the miscegenation cases involved
prohibitory provisions. These varied in degree of strength, ranging from
constitutional prohibitions and statutory declarations that such marriages
were void, to provisions with criminal penalties for such marriages.4
The local laws embodied mores significant to maintaining the social order
of the communities concerned.' Virtually all of the cases declared the
marriages to be void. 7
One case, State v. Bell,' exemplifies the similarity between these
cases and our same-sex couple married in Hawaii. In Bell, the husband
461. Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 455, at 2005 (quoting W. JORDAN,
WHITE OVER BLACK 177-78 (1968)).
462. Lay, supra note 452, at 171.
463. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
464. Id. at 409.
465. Taintor, supra note 294, at 628 & n.109.
466. Fine, supra note 168, at 43.
467. Taintor, supra note 294, at 628.
468. State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. (7 Barger) 9 (1872).
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was charged with fornicating with his "wife." The couple, who lived in
Tennessee, went to Mississippi to get married and immediately returned
to Tennessee. Not bothering to follow any choice-of-law rule in reaching
its decision, the court delineated local views which it felt were expressed
in Tennessee's attempt to regulate the racial composition of Tennessee
families.'
Extending the rule to the width asked for by the defendant,
and we might have in Tennessee the father living with his
daughter, the son with mother, the brother with the sister, in
lawful wedlock, because they had formed such relations in a
State or country where they were not prohibited. The Turk or
Mohammedan, with his numerous wives, may establish his
harem at the doors of the capitol, and we are without remedy.
Yet none of these are more revolting, more to be avoided, or
more unnatural than the case before us.4"
It does not take much imagination to envision reading this language
applied to a same-sex marriage, celebrated in Hawaii, and challenged in
various states.
Not until the 1948 case of Perez v. Lippold,47' when the California
Supreme Court declared its anti-miscegenation statute to be
unconstitutional, did a trend begin toward recognizing the racial
discrimination inherent in these statutes. As Justice Traynor noted in
Perez: "A member of any of these races may find himself barred by law
from marrying the person of his choice and that person to him may be
irreplaceable. Human beings are bereft of worth and dignity by a
doctrine that would make them as interchangeable as trains. "4n it took
nineteen years, until the Supreme Court in Loving declared all anti-
miscegenation statutes to be unconstitutional, before states were required
to validate the interracial marriages of their domiciliaries who went to
another state to be married, and returned to the domicile to live as a
married couple. 4' The result of Loving is that "legislative bigotry
based upon social, economic, political, religious, or historical beliefs
about racial supremacy cannot restrict an individual's right to freely
469. id.
470. Id. at 11.
471. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
472. Id. at 25.
473. Despite their being declared unconstitutional, state legislatures did not repeal
miscegenation statutes immediately. As late as 1972, Alabama federal courts had to order
state officials to stop enforcing its anti-miscegenation law, and Mississippi did not repeal
its law until that same year. Lay, supra note 452, at 177.
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choose his or her sexual partners or spouses."474 Freedom to choose
one's sexual partners without regard to race signaled the end of legalized
second-class citizenship.475 Hopefully, the revolution concerning same-
sex marriages that has begun with Baehr will also signal the end of
legalized second-class citizenship for people choosing same-sex
relationships.
C. Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage Is the Better Rule of Law
The Loving court ended hundreds of years of prohibitions against
interracial marriage in numerous states. Today no one questions that anti-
miscegenation statutes were discriminatory.476 Those statutes are now
outlawed because they promoted feelings of inferiority and second-class
citizenship, which the state should not be allowed to promote.4'
Denying same-sex marriage similarly promotes feelings of inferiority
and second-class citizenship. Either gay men and lesbians are being
singled out for adverse treatment under marital legislation, which is
invidious discrimination, or, although gay men and lesbians are being
singled out and treated adversely, it is not based on invidious
discrimination because the group deserves that treatment.4 78  "Most
theorists and jurists supporting the ban on same-sex marriages deny that
the state is singling out and punishing homosexuals by refusing to
recognize same-sex marriages. Instead, they appeal to the definition of
marriage or to the traditions behind marriage. " '
But, as the Baehr court recognized, the Loving court's rejection of
definitional or traditional bases for prohibiting miscegenous marriages
applies equally to same-sex marriages. Just as anti-miscegenation statutes
promoted white supremacy, so too the ban on same-sex marriages
promotes the idea that heterosexuals are superior to gay men and
lesbians.48 Legislators and judges attempting to avoid the charge of
474. Id. at 178.
475. Id.
476. Strasser, supra note 10, at 1016.
477. Id. at 1016.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. See id. at 1016-17 n.152 (discussing the following sources: McConnell v.
Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir. 1971) (describing homosexuality as socially
repugnant), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972); Buchanan, supra note 10, at 565 (moral
excellence promoted by heterosexual marriage would be undermined by recognizing
homosexual marriage); Hannah Schwarzschild, Same-Sex Marriages and Constitutional
Privacy: Moral Threat and Legal Anomaly, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 94, 123 (1988-89)
(traditional concern is that recognition of same-sex marriage would be uniquely destructive
threat to the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage); J. Harvie Wilkinson III &
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invidious discrimination may claim that they were prohibiting same-sex
marriage, not due to discrimination against gay men and lesbians, but due
to concerns for promoting the institutions of marriage and family." 1
These same justifications, however, were also used when considering the
anti-miscegenation statutes. Legislators and judges claimed that invidious
discrimination was not behind the laws; instead, they were attempting to
preserve racial integrity, to prevent the "corruption of blood" and
"obliteration of racial pride." One only needs to consider their language
to recognize their purpose.
Prohibiting this invidious discrimination, as the Baehr court has
done, is the better public policy. Just as Perez led the evolution of the
law from accepting anti-miscegenation statutes to declaring them to be
unconstitutional in Loving, so too does Baehr lead a similar evolution.
State court judges faced with choice-of-law questions when their
domiciliaries leave the state, go to Hawaii and marry, and return to their
domicile should reach the better result and recognize the Hawaiian
marriage. While it will be difficult for many judges to take this
progressive step, choice-of-law statutes and theories provide ample
support for such a result. Since granting or denying recognition are
equally likely results, courts should prohibit invidious discrimination and
uphold our couple's marriage.
IV. CONCLUSION
Baehr v. Lewin began a legal revolution that has the potential to
change the face of the United States. In 1995, the trial court will
consider the case on remand4" and determine whether the State of
Hawaii can establish a compelling state interest in restricting marriage to
opposite-sex couples and whether its marriage statutes further that interest
G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection for PersonalLifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
563, 572 (1977) (hallowed marital status should not be given to alternative life choices
such as homosexuality)).
481. Strasser, supra note 10, at 1017. For example, in Act 217, the Hawaii
legislature finds that § 572-1 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes and all other marriage
licensing statutes were enacted to "foster and protect the propagation of the human race
through male-female marriages." Act 217, § 1. The legislature found this to be true,
despite its recognition that this finding would seemingly run counter to its claim, later in
the act, that the statute's 1984 amendment, deleting the requirement that applicants show
that they are not impotent or physically incapable of entering into a marriage, did not
detract from the statute's "original purpose." Id. If proving one's ability to propagate
is unnecessary for opposite-sex couples, it is difficult to understand how restricting
marriage to opposite-sex couples will further the state's claimed purpose of procreation
behind its marriage statutes. See also supra note 104.
482. Gross, supra note 17, at B12.
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with the least restrictive means possible. Regardless of how the case is
ultimately resolved, Baehr has moved same-sex couples one step closer
to having the constitutionally-protected right to marry extended to us.
Whichever state becomes the first to recognize same-sex marriage will see
scores of couples arriving to exchange marriage vows.
Then these couples will return home and the next level of the
revolution will occur. With marriage licenses in hand, they will ask
various institutions to recognize their new marital status. Some will
refuse, and the courts will be the arena for determining whether their
right to marry will be vindicated. Those courts will decide the issue
using statutory construction and choice-of-law theories. Advocates for
same-sex couples will need to become conversant in the statutes and
theories that control the discourse. For many courts, the issue will
ultimately turn on whether recognizing an out-of-state same-sex marriage
violates the state's strong public policy. Using statutes and precedent,
advocates will attempt to push the courts toward validation of the
marriage. Some will resist, and it will be time to explain to those courts
that recognizing same-sex marriage is the better choice. Using the
miscegenation cases analogously, we will attempt to convince the courts
that ending age-old discrimination and extending the right to marry to
same-sex couples is a better expression of state policy than continuing
homophobic objections to these marriages.
This road, like the one leading to the Baehr case, will not be easy.
But advocates who are well-versed in choice-of-law jurisprudence will be
able to obtain victories for their clients. Once states recognize these out-
of-state marriages, it will simply be a matter of time before states
statutorily permit them at home. Same-sex marriage will follow
miscegenous marriage in finally finding legal acceptance.
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